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Glossary of Abbreviations: 
 
BiH ± Bosna i Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzergovina) 
CARDS - Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Democratic Stabilisation 
IPA ± Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
IRI ± International Republican Institute 
NDI ± National Democratic Institute 
OHR ± Office of the High Representative 
SAA ± Stabilization and Association Agreement 
USAID ± United States Agency for International Development 
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Introduction 
0XFKKDVEHHQZULWWHQDERXW%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VUHFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGGHYHORSPHQW
process over the last 20 years, but little has been written evaluating the effectiveness of the 
financial aid that flooded into the country after the signing of the Dayton Accords.  While large 
amounts of aid came right after the ending the war in 1996, international aid has continued to be 
given to this nation ever since to aid in reconstruction and development; any form of aid is bound 
to have consequences on that nation.   
Despite how much money and effort the international community has pumped into 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, why does the federal govHUQPHQW¶VVWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQUHPDLQZHDN
particularly in the areas of institutional capacity, the legitimacy of the federal government, and 
economic development?  The purpose of this paper is to determine how international actors, 
through the use of economic aid, the Office of the High Commission, and other soft-power 
approaches, have influenced the state consolidation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  To that end it 
VKDOOEHDUJXHGWKDWWKH(8DQG86$,'ZKLOHWKH\KDYHKDGVRPHSRVLWLYHHIIHFWVRQ%L+¶V
state consolidation, have ultimately failed to effect real change of the political sphere because 
conditionality is only so effective and the EU and USAID have not focused enough on the core 
RI%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VSUREOHPVQDPHO\HWKQLFWHQVLRQVDQGDQRYHUO\FRPSOH[
inefficient government. 
In this paper the primary international actors that have been chosen to be discussed are 
USAID and the EU; these actors were chosen because they represent the largest investors and 
influencers of BiH.  While there are many other actors including individual states, other IGOs 
like the United Nations and the World Bank, and international NGOS, they were not chosen 
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because individually they have not had as great an impact.  Collectively they have had an 
important influence, but for the scope and limitations of this paper in terms of research time they 
have been excluded for the purposes of this paper. 
In order to figure out how international actors have impacted Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the first step shall be to look at existing theories of post-conflict political development to 
determine the framework by ZKLFK%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VVWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQSURFHVVKDV
been developed.  Based on those theories several hypotheses shall be formed.  The second step 
will be to examine what roles international actors have played in terms of post-conflict political 
development in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  What projects have major international actors like 
USAID and the EU funded and how have those projects and the conditions that have come with 
those projects have affected %L+¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOFDSDFLW\HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWDQGWKHIHGHUDO
JRYHUQPHQW¶VOHJLWLPDF\.  By looking at these factors, these actors will be analyzed to determine 
what role international actors have played in shaping the state consolidation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
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Background 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small nation of about 3,800,000 people located in the 
Balkans1.  Nowadays it is largely a quiet nation; merely a blip on most Western media¶s radar.  
But it was less than 20 years ago that this state was embroiled in a bloody civil war that only 
ended in 1996.  Because this civil war was an ethnic conflict, estimates for how many died vary 
depending on the source with numbers coming from the actors involved varying wildly from one 
another and from outside sources2.  In general, it is usually estimated anywhere between 100,000 
and 300,000 people died.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia after 
12 years of data collection published a study in 2010 that gave their final estimate of 104,372 
individuals3.  After the end of the war the even larger result was the displacement of about half 
RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRSXODWLRQ as a result of ethnic cleansing.  Again, estimates vary, but one source 
estimates that 1.1 million Bosnians were displaced within Bosnia and 1.2 million became 
refugees in neighboring countries and across the world4. 
Since then Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has made progress as a post-conflict state.  For 
countries fresh out of a civil war the first five years hold the most risk of devolving back into 
civil war.  Half of all post-war countries resume violent conflict within the span of 10 years5. Yet, 
BiH has avoided these trends and has gone 18 years without large-scale violence.  When the 
                                                                                                                    
1  ͞ĞŶƐƵƐ^ŚŽǁƐƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶŽƐŶŝĂŶWŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ^ŝŶĐĞϭϵϵϬƐ͘͟ABC  News,  November  6,  2013.  Accessed  
April  3,  2014.  http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-­‐11-­‐06/census-­‐shows-­‐dramatic-­‐decline-­‐in-­‐bosnian-­‐population-­‐
since-­‐1990s/5072072.  
2  A  big  part  of  the  debate  comes  from  who  is  counted  as  a  victim,  for  example  if  the  person  died  as  a  direct  result  
of  violence  or  an  indirect  result  of  the  war  conditions.  
3  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  former  Yugoslavia.  "New  War  Demographics  Feature  on  the  ICTY  website."  
March  29,  2011.  http://www.icty.org/sid/10622.  
4  Bieber,  Florian.  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance  (New  York:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2006),  29.  
5  Galtung,  Fredrik,  and  Martin  Tisné.  "A  New  Approach  to  Postwar  Reconstruction."  Journal  of  Democracy  20,  no.  4  
(October  2009):  93.  Academic  Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  15,  2013).  
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violence broke out it was a medium-developed industrialized country whose people enjoyed 
living standards higher than most comparable Eastern European ex-Communist countries, some 
of which are now in the EU.  This stands in contrast to much of the developing world where most 
civil wars the mid-20th century onwards have occurred.  When the violence erupted in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Europeans were astonished as very few had ever thought that violent conflicts 
would arise within Europe again6. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a nation comprised of three major ethnic groups: Croats, 
Bosniaks, and Serbs.  While all three speak essentially the same language and share similar 
cultures, their distinctions as different groups have been one of the most important factors 
DIIHFWLQJ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VGHYHORSPHQWLQWRZKDWLWLVWRGD\.  There are many factors 
as to why civil war broke out in BiH.  Yugoslavia had tried to create a non-HWKQLF³<XJRVODY´
identity and tried to downplay ethnic difference, but with the end of the Cold War and the 
weakening of Yugoslavia, people became more ethnically conscious as a result of ethnic 
nationalist movements that had risen to prominence throughout the Balkans in the 1980s.  This 
led to the dissolving of Yugoslavia as nationalist movements in what would become Slovenia, 
Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia created successful secessionist movements.  With these 
nations gone Yugoslavia still existed, and would technically exist until 2006 witK0RQWHQHJUR¶V
secession, but it was already much smaller and weaker.  The secessionist movements in these 
countries were particularly successful because of their largely homogenous populations.  One 
exception to this was that in Croatia there was a sizeable minority Serb population, but they were 
                                                                                                                    
6  Galtung,  Fredrik,  and  Martin  Tisné.  "A  New  Approach  to  Postwar  Reconstruction."  Journal  of  Democracy  20,  no.  4  
(October  2009):  93.  Academic  Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  15,  2013).  
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ODUJHO\FHQWUDOL]HGLQRQHDUHDDQGVRZHUHJLYHQPHDVXUHVRIDXWRQRP\WRDSSHDVHWKH6HUE¶V
fears of being oppressed in the new state7.   
Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, had a diverse and integrated population 
consisting of Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks.  As nationalist movements had grown during the 
1980s in Croatia and Slovenia, so too had they grown in BiH.  When the territory had its first 
elections, still a part of the Yugoslav state, opinion polls favored multi-ethnic parties, but to the 
surprise of observers, three nationalist parties emerged as the victors.  They formed a coalition, 
but it soon became clear they had competing visions for the future of the region.  When Slovenia 
and Croatia declared independence, the Bosniak and Croat parties pushed for independence, but 
the Serb party, the Serbian Democratic Party, or SDS, was against it as it did not want BiH to 
separate from Yugoslavia and its successor state, Serbia.  From September 1991 onwards the 
SDS VWDUWHGFRQVROLGDWLQJLWVFRQWURORYHU³6HUE$XWRQRPRXV$UHDV´,Q+HU]HJRYLQDWKHUH
were Croat-majority areas as well that the central government had little influence over.  When a 
referendum for independence in what became BiH was held, the SDS boycotted it and so, based 
on Bosniak and Croat votes, the referendum overwhelmingly passed with 99.4% of those who 
voted in favor8.  However, from there events escalated as Serb forces continued to consolidate 
and expand their territory of influence which turned into ethnic cleansing and a civil war that 
would last for three bloody years. 
The Serb cause was spearheaded by Slobodan MiloãHYLü president of Serbia, who 
encouraged the Bosnian Serb population to wage war against the Bosniaks in order to create an 
                                                                                                                    
7  BeůůŽŶŝ͕ZŽďĞƌƚŽ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͗ĂǇƚŽŶŝƐĞĂĚ͊>ŽŶŐ>ŝǀĞĂǇƚŽŶ͊͟/ŶPathways  from  Ethnic  Conflict:  Institutional  
Redesign  in  Divided  Societies,  by  John  Coakley,  95-­‐115.  New  York:  Routledge,  2010.  
8  Bieber,  Florian,  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance.  New  York:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2006,  21-­‐26.  
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independent Serb state that would then unite with Serbia.  Bosnian Serb nationalism gained its 
power the same way that the Bosnian Croat nationalism did; people were scared of being 
minorities in the new Bosnia-Herzegovinian state and of being oppressed by the Bosniak 
plurality.  It was from this fear and the nationalism that grew in the 1980s that ethnic violence 
broke out despite the ethnic communities having previously lived in relative harmony for over a 
century9.  Behind this nationalism was the goal of creating a region of Serbs which would 
eventually leave BiH and join with Serbia.  It was that mindset that led to Serb military forces 
³FOHDQVLQJ´WKHDUHDVWKH\controlled of all non-Serbs.  7KLV³HWKQLFFOHDQVLQJ´HQWDLOHGPLOLWLDV
using force ranging from threats of violence to large-scale murder in order to remove non-Serbs 
from what they considered ought to be Serb land.  Some Croats in Croat-dominated areas also 
had grand ideas for consolidating their power over Herzegovina and joining with Croatia, though 
WKDWPRYHPHQWZDVQHYHUDVVWURQJDVWKH6HUEV¶%RVQLDNVWKXVIRXQGWKHPVHOYHVILJKWLQJERWK
Serbs and Croats, with all three sides taking heavy losses and all three sides having scores of 
non-combatants killed, whether through murder or sickness or starvation as a side-result of being 
in a war-zone.  This civil war would only be concluded with the signing of the Dayton Accords 
in Dayton, Ohio in December of 1995. 
With the signing of these accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina finally had peace and a new 
political system.  With the creation of any new political system, many ideas and competing 
interests were involved in the process.  As the Dayton Accords were a United States-led peace 
deal, the US had an obvious influence on the system that was created, but Europe had a sizeable 
role as well.  The origins of the Dayton Accords and the political system they created come from 
a previously rejected peace treaty deal proposed in 1994 by the Contact Group, consisting of 
                                                                                                                    
9  ĞůůŽŶŝ͕ZŽďĞƌƚŽ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͗ĂǇƚŽŶŝƐĞĂĚ͊>ŽŶŐ>ŝǀĞĂǇƚŽŶ͊͟/ŶPathways  from  Ethnic  Conflict:  Institutional  
Redesign  in  Divided  Societies,  by  John  Coakley,  97.  New  York:  Routledge,  2010.  
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France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States which proposed a 
federalist Bosnia and Herzegovina which would consist of a Bosniak-Croat federation and a Serb 
republic acting as autonomous entities under a weak central government10.  
One important issue the Dayton Accords addressed was the settlement of the territory 
disputes.  Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain intact, but split into two entities with the 
Bosniak and Croat-dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina having 51% of the land and 
the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS) having 49%.  In addition, GLVWULFWRI%Uþko was 
declared to be under international administration.  It was given this status as it separates the two 
main geographic parts of BiH that Republika Srpska occupies and thus is of strategic importance.  
All boundaries within the nation are administrative11.  For Bosnian citizens there is complete 
freedom of movement within the country, though not all citizens want to go to certain parts of 
the country. 
7KHGLVWULFWRI%UþNRLVSDUWLFXODUO\LQWHUHVWLQJLQKRZLWVSROLWLFDOVWUXFWXUHLVVHWXS
GLIIHUHQWIURPWKH)HGHUDWLRQ56DQGWKHIHGHUDO%RVQLDQJRYHUQPHQW%UþNR is unique in how 
it is quite diverse, with a decent proportion of Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats living in it.  In 1991 it 
was 25% Croats, 20% Serbs, and 44% Bosniaks though there are still no numbers as to what this 
proportion would be today.  It is governed by a mayor and has a 29-member district assembly.  
Remarkably, there is no formal power-sharing arrangement for the governance of this district.  
The only reference to ethnicity within the system of governance is the reservation of three seats 
to each of the three main ethnic groups, with the rest of the seats open for anyone to run.  In 
                                                                                                                    
10  Caplan,  Richard.  "Assessing  the  Dayton  Accord:  The  Structural  Weaknesses  of  the  General  Framework  
Agreement  for  Peace  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Diplomacy  &  Statecraft  11,  no.  2  (July  2000):  216.  Academic  
Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  29,  2013).  
11  Caplan,  Richard.  "Assessing  the  Dayton  Accord:  The  Structural  Weaknesses  of  the  General  Framework  
Agreement  for  Peace  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Diplomacy  &  Statecraft  11,  no.  2  (July  2000):  217.  Academic  
Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  29,  2013).  
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addition, the administration emphasizes merit and the best interests of the district over ethnic 
quotas.  At the same time the administration also tries to match the ethnic proportions of the 
district so as to be representative.   
6RPHYLHZ%UþNRDVDPRGHOIRUPXOWL-ethnic governance, but there is the fact that the 
most powerful political leader continues to be the international supervisor, who has even more 
power to influence the district government than the Office of the High Representative, the 
representative for the international community who is the highest civilian authority in the nation.  
Neither the international supervisor nor the High Representative are Bosnian citizens and as such 
represent international interests.  In addition, nationalist parties continue to dominate the politics 
RI%UþNRPXFKDVWKH\GRLQWKHUHVWRIWKHFRXQWU\12.  Some scholars have debated whether this 
model could be transferred to the federal level, but while this district may be more progressive 
and more diverse, for many reasons including hostility from Serb and Croat nationalist groups as 
well as the presence of an international advisor make this model not transferable. 
Though the political system for BiH changed, the political parties after the end of the war 
largely remained the same.  That being said, there were more moderate parties, many still 
ethnically-based, but others like the Social Democratic Party of BiH more multi-ethnic and 
focused on more broad issues.  Still, the traditional nationalist parties that have been around 
since before the war, like the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA) which caters to the Bosniak population, and the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ), 
cRQWLQXHWREHLPSRUWDQWLQWRGD\¶VSROLWLFVWKRXJKWKH\GRQRWXQequivocally dominate politics.  
Still, the presence of these parties and how they have continued beyond the war demonstrates the 
                                                                                                                    
12  Bieber,  Florian,  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance.  New  York:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2006,  135-­‐138.  
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continuity between politics before and DIWHUWKHZDUDQGKRZWKHWRQHRI%L+¶VSROLWLFVFRQWLQXHV
to be rife with ethnic tensions. 
That being said, the Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH), a successor to the pre-war 
League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has become an important party in modern 
politics.  It was an SDP BiH member who won the Croat presidential seat13 in 2010 and it won 
the largest percentage of the votes (26%) for Federation voters for the parliamentary elections in 
2010.  In addition, other non-ethnic-based political parties like the Alliance of Independent 
Social Democrats (SNSD) have gained importance with this center-right Serb party winning the 
Serb presidential seat as well as a whopping 43% of the total votes cast by Bosnian Serbs in the 
2010 parliamentary elections14.  While ethnic politics remains prominent, these results show that 
there has been positive movement in the political sphere towards non-ethnic-based political 
parties. 
Recent Developments 
Unexpectedly, in 2014 for the first time since the creation of the new Bosnian state there 
were mass protests against the government.  Organized Bosnian citizens protested about 
unemployment and corruption with the original protests coming from Tuzla where 
unemployment is as high as 55% and has been so for many years.  This unemployment comes 
from the botched privatization of four factories after the Dayton Accords were signed that 
resulted in the factories never being reopened.  These factories provided the majority of jobs for 
                                                                                                                    
13  In  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  there  are  three  presidents,  one  to  represent  each  main  ethnic  group,  who  rotate  
every  8  months  for  the  duration  of  their  4  year  term.  
14    ƌƐůĂŐĂŶŝĐ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂWŽůůƐZĞƐƵůƚƐ͗ŽƐŶŝĂŬƐsŽƚĞĨŽƌŚĂŶŐĞ͟  Balkan  Insight,  October  4,  2010.  Accessed  
December  14,  2013.  http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosniaks-­‐vote-­‐for-­‐change-­‐serbs-­‐and-­‐croats-­‐remain-­‐
loyal-­‐to-­‐nationalists.  
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Tuzla natives15. In this case and in many other botched privatizations in BiH, companies and 
factories were sold, but the process was not always been transparent, with cases where open 
bidding was actively avoided.  In these botched privatizations companies were sold to foreign 
investors who gutted and effectively dissolved them.  While not an illegal or corrupt process, this 
left many Bosnian workers without employment as their jobs no longer existed.  That being said, 
there were allegations of corruption and irregularities during this privatization process.  
According to Global Integrity 2007: 
³7KHJRYHUQLQJ5HSXEOLND6USVND$OOLDQFHRI,QGHSHQGHQW6RFLDO'HPRFUDWV616'SDUW\KDVVROGRII
many of Serb-FRQWUROOHG5HSXEOLND6USVND¶VEHVWDVVHWVZLWKRXWSXEOLFELGGLQJRULQLUUHJXODUSULYDWL]DWLRQ
deals, including the state telephone company, refinery and tobacco factory.  Significant public-works projects 
KDYHDOVREHHQXQLODWHUDOO\QHJRWLDWHGDQGDZDUGHGZLWKRXWSXEOLFELGGLQJWRSULYDWHFRPSDQLHV´16 
In the case of Tuzla, the company that owned these factories was bought, but then the new 
owners decided to not keep the factories running for their economic benefit, thus leaving 
thousands of Tuzla citizens jobless.  It was the rampant unemployment and allegations of 
corruption that set Tuzla citizens to protest, but soon the protests spread to other parts of the 
country. 
On February 7, 2014, angry protestors set fire to part of the presidential palace in 
Sarajevo as well as other government buildings in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zenica.  During this 
surge of violence that week in February protestors clashed with riot police with police using 
rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the protestors.  From February 6-8 was the duration of the 
                                                                                                                    
15  ^ŵĂůĞ͕ůŝƐŽŶ͘͞ZŽŽƚƐŽĨŽƐŶŝĂŶWƌŽƚĞƐƚƐ>ŝĞŝŶWĞĂĐĞĐĐŽƌĚƐŽĨϭϵϵϱ͘͟New  York  Times,  February  14,  2014.  
Accessed  March  4,  2014.  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/world/europe/roots-­‐of-­‐bosnian-­‐protests-­‐lie-­‐in-­‐
peace-­‐accords-­‐of-­‐1995.html?_r=0  
16  Chêne,  Marie.  Corruption  and  Anti-­‐Corruption  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  Anti-­‐Corruption  Resource  Centre,  
2009.  http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-­‐and-­‐anti-­‐corruption-­‐in-­‐bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina-­‐bih/.  
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riots across the country in which some protestors did get violent, fighting police mainly with fists 
and rocks.  Over a 150 people were injured as a result of this unexpected violence, but by 
February 9th the riots had ceased and all protests thereafter were largely peaceful17.  Despite 
these few days of violence this movement was primarily peaceful. 
While these protests have surprised people, the cause of these protests is thoroughly 
unsurprising.  What these protestors have been railing against are problems that have plagued 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for years.  The case RI7X]OD¶VIDFWRULHVLVMXVWRQHH[DPSOHLQDFRXQWU\
that is known to be corrupt and economically weak.  With the Dayton Accords came neoliberal 
UHIRUPVZLWKWKHSURPLVHWKDWLWZRXOG³ULVHDOOERDWV´LPSURYLQJWKHHFRQRP\DQGWKHVWDQGDUGV
of living for all citizens.  But yet today it can be argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina is still in a 
worse economic state than it was prior to the 1990s war when the country was known for its 
industrial sector. 
What mainly surprised the world was that these protests took place at all.  For 18 years 
these problems in Tuzla and in the rest of the country had languished without any real organized 
movements so the question is why these protests took place now.  Many scholars and people 
both in and out of BiH questioned whether it was even in the nature for Bosnians to rebel against 
the established norms of the government.  Yet these protests started in 2014 and with more steam 
than many would have imagined was possible.  2QHUHDVRQIRUWKLVFRXOGEHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
failure to pass constitutional reform on minority rights that led to aid from the EU being cut in 
                                                                                                                    
17  DĂƌƐǌĂů͕ŶĚƌĞǁ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂWƌŽƚĞƐƚƐ͗ϭϱϬ/ŶũƵƌĞĚĂƐĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ^Ğƚ&ŝƌĞƚŽWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůWĂůĂĐĞ͘͟The  Telegraph,  
February  8,  2014.  Accessed  March  4,  2014.  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/10625810/Bosnia-­‐protests-­‐150-­‐injured-­‐as-­‐
demonstrators-­‐set-­‐fire-­‐to-­‐presidential-­‐palace.html  
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KDOILQDVWKHVWUDZWKDWEURNHWKHFDPHO¶VEDFN$QRWKHULVEHWWHURUJDQL]DWLRQDPRQJ
Bosnian advocates that finally created a large enough network to stage these protests. 
What is in question now is what will come about because of these protests.  Several local-
level officials have already resigned, yet many more politicians fail to recognize the significance 
of these protests.  Notably, these protests have been centered mostly in the Federation side of 
Bosnia with few protests in Republika Srpska.  Croats and Bosniaks appear to have been united 
by the desire for government reform, but Bosnian Serbs at this point appear more reluctant to 
join in, likely due to the influence of Serb nationalism.  There have been small groups of Serb 
protestors, but they have been intimidated by Serb nationalists18.  The elections later this year in 
October 2014 will be the true test as to how much change will occur in the government as a 
result of these protests.  What is clear is that there needs to be government reform.  Where 
international outside forces have failed to inspire major reform, perhaps Bosnians are the ones 
who will finally be able to press for real change in their government. 
The Bosnian government is well-known for being excessively complicated. With four 
levels of government and 14 constitutions and governments with legislative power, it is no 
wonder that for the casual observer, Bosnia and +HU]HJRYLQD¶VSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVHHP
incomprehensible.  Furthermore this complex legal framework has resulted in a lack of 
WUDQVSDUHQF\DQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\7KXVLQRUGHUWREHWWHUXQGHUVWDQG%L+¶VSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW
it is important to first have an understanding of the basics of this governmental system and its 
complexities. 
 
                                                                                                                    
18͞WƌŽƚĞƐƚƐŝŶŽƐŶŝĂ͘͟The  Economist,  February  15,  2014.  Accessed  March  4,  2014.  
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21596572-­‐latest-­‐troubles-­‐bosnia-­‐may-­‐wake-­‐up-­‐countrys-­‐inept-­‐leaders-­‐
fire.  
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Bosnian Governance: A Case Study in Absurd Complexity 
The basic political structure of BiH is a federalist structure created by the Dayton 
Accords with four levels of government.  It has a weak central government with more power 
devolved to the entity, cantonal, and local levels.  At the highest level is the federal government.  
The second highest level consists of the two entities: the Croat/Bosniak majority Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb majority Republika Srpska, or the Serb Republic.  The 
Federation adds a third level with 10 autonomous cantons, each having its own constitution and 
government.  Finally, the lowest level is the municipalities with the Federation having 79 
municipalities, the Serb Republic having 62 municipalitiesDQG%UþNREHLQJWKHone 
municipality independent of both entities19. 
At the state level the main institutions are the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, The 
Parliamentary Assembly (made up of the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives), 
and the Constitutional Court.  There are other institutions at the federal level, but these 4 
represent some of the largest and most important bodies.  The Presidency is unusual because 
Bosnia and Herzegovina actually has three presidents, one each for the Croats, Serbs, and 
Bosniaks, as required by the Dayton Accords.  This part of the government in particular is 
controversial as it has been determined by the European Court of Human Rights to be a violation 
of the rights of citizens who are not members of these ethnic groups.  Bosnian citizens living in 
the Federation vote for the Croat and Bosniak presidents while citizens living in the Serb 
                                                                                                                    
19  Bieber,  Florian,  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance.  New  York:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2006,  46,  60-­‐61.  
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Republic vote for the Serb president.  The chair of the presidents rotates between the three 
members, each serving for 8 months, with elections every four years20. 
The Council of Ministers serves as a Cabinet for the Bosnian Presidents.  This Council 
contains one Chairman or Chairwoman plus 9 Ministers: 2/3 chosen from the Federation and 1/3 
chosen from the Serb Republic.  The Chairperson of the Council of Ministers is a de-facto Prime 
Minister; because of the importance of this position, the Chair must be nominated by the 
Presidency and then approved by the House of Representatives.  The Chairperson once approved 
then decides on whom the other Ministers will be, along with a Deputy Minister for him or 
herself who must be from a different ³constituent nation´DFRQVWLWXHQWQDWLRQEHLQJRQHRIWKH
three main ethnic groups whose rights are enshrined in the constitution.  One reservation for 
minorities is that one minister or the Secretary General must not be from one of the constituent 
nations.  The decision-making process for this council is consensus-based, requiring the presence 
of two members from each constituent nation and half of its total members in order to hold 
sessions21.  Because the Council must make decisions based on consensus, the decisions made by 
this body are obviously slow in development, even with the ministers being all chosen by the 
Chairperson. 
%RVQLD¶V)HGHUDO3DUOLDPHQWKDVWZRFKDPEHUVWKe House of Representatives and the 
House of Peoples.  The House of Representatives has 42 members that are directly elected by the 
Bosnian people, with 2/3 of the seats elected in the Federation of BiH with the other 1/3 elected 
in the Serb Republic.  In the House of Representatives there are no reserved seats so, for example, 
                                                                                                                    
20  Bieber,  Florian,  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance.  New  York:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2006,  48.  
21  Bieber,  Florian,  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance.  New  York:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2006,  52-­‐53.  
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in 2002 there were 12 Serbs and 2 Bosniaks that were elected from Republika Srpska, though 
there are clear ethnic divides between the two entities.  The House of Peoples has 15 members, 
with 5 members from each of the constituent nations.  The members of the House of Peoples are 
indirectly elected, being chosen by the House of Representatives.  Both houses are presided over 
by a chair and two deputies, each from a different nation, with the chairmanship rotating every 8 
months, much like the system of the presidency22. 
Because the House of Peoples is based on ethnic caucuses, it is primarily tasked with 
preserving the interests of the main constituent nations while the House of Representatives takes 
care of more broad nation-wide interests.  All main ethnic groups have veto rights for legislation 
WKH\IHHOZRXOGEHJRLQJDJDLQVWWKHLUJURXS¶s interests.  Though a simple majority vote is 
needed for passage of all legislation in both houses of the parliament, should a majority of 
delegates from any constituent ethnic group declare a proposed law to be harmful to their group 
then it then needs the approval of a majority of the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb delegates present 
and voting in the House of Peoples.  If this veto is challenged by the majority of one of the other 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶GHOHJDWHVWKHQWKH&KDLURIWKH+RXVHRI3HRSOHVPXVWFRQYHQHD-delegate Joint 
Commission with one representative from each community to resolve the matter.  If the 
Commission fails in resolving the conflict then the matter goes to the Constitutional Court23. 
The Constitutional Court is made up of 9 members: 4 from the Federation, 2 from the 
Serb Republic, and 3 chosen by the president of the European Court of Human Rights.  The 
Constitutional Court has made many LPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQVLQYROYLQJWKHIRUPDWLRQRI%L+¶V
                                                                                                                    
22  Caplan,  Richard.  "Assessing  the  Dayton  Accord:  The  Structural  Weaknesses  of  the  General  Framework  
Agreement  for  Peace  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Diplomacy  &  Statecraft  11,  no.  2  (July  2000):  219-­‐220.  Academic  
Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  29,  2013).  
23  Caplan,  Richard.  "Assessing  the  Dayton  Accord:  The  Structural  Weaknesses  of  the  General  Framework  
Agreement  for  Peace  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Diplomacy  &  Statecraft  11,  no.  2  (July  2000):  220.  Academic  
Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  29,  2013).  
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political institution, especially in the first few years after the war.  For example, for a time the 
Chairperson of the Ministers had two co-chairs and they would rotate much like the presidency 
until in 2002 when the Constitutional Court declared this practice not in-line with what the Prime 
Minister, or de facto Prime Minister in this case, should be, and thus unconstitutional.   
Bosnia and Herzegovina can be described as a triple-power sharing system.  On all levels 
of government Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks share equal power.  This power sharing involves four 
features: grand coalitions, mutual veto rights, proportionality, and segmental autonomy.  Grand 
coalitions, or coalitions that include members from all three dominant nations, are required at the 
entity and state level governments.  Mutual rights veto is each constitutional ethnic community 
has the right to veto a decision by parliament of the state, the entities, and most cantons that may 
negatively impact their community.  Proportional representation is required at the federal and, as 
of 2002, the entity levels as well.  Segmental autonomy is granted by the state to the entities and 
by the Federation to its cantons with the purpose of giving the different ethnic groups more 
DXWRQRP\0RVWRIWKH)HGHUDWLRQ¶VFDQWRQVDUHHWKQLFDOO\KRPRJHQRXVVR&URDWVJHWVRPH
autonomy within the cantons in which they form the majority24.  The result of this balancing of 
ethnic rights adds to the complexity of an already overly complex system of government. 
O ffice of the High Representative 
One other body that the Dayton Accords created was the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR).  The OHR is the ultimate civilian authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
responsible for the continued implementation of the Dayton Accords.  It plays a unique role in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is an independent international body largely controlled by the 
                                                                                                                    
24  Bieber,  Florian,  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance.  New  York:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2006,  43-­‐44.  
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European Union and the United States who elect the High Representative.  This hybrid position 
is both an international actor and a part of the Bosnian government.  More importantly, as all of 
the High Representatives have been Europeans the OHR has served a dual purpose of first of all 
upholding the Dayton Accords as well as pushing for reforms, but since 2006 it also has served 
as a guiding role for BiH to eventually join the EU.  For this reason, the OHR is an important 
actor to keep in mind when analyzing the role of international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The High Representative has the power to compel the government to comply with the 
terms of the accords by dismissing elected officials as well as imposing or revoking legislation as 
he or she sees necessary.  The OHR has beeQYHU\LQIOXHQWLDORQ%L+¶VSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW
The High Representative is responsible for many changes in the Bosnian central government 
including the creation of one state judicial system, one customs service, one intelligence service, 
and one single defense structure with a new Minister of Defense.  There has been plenty of 
criticism of the OHR as particularly before 2006 it played a very active role in the government, 
leading many domestic politicians to stick to nationalist rhetoric and not allow for compromise 
as they knew the High Representative would push the legislation through no matter what25.  
Since 2006 the role of the OHR has dramatically reduced as it has shifted from supervision to 
conditionality tied to the prospect of becoming a candidate for accession to the European Union.  
There has been talk of closing the OHR, but since progress towards becoming a candidate has 
been slow, for now the OHR remains a presence in BiH26. 
                                                                                                                    
25  ĞůůŽŶŝ͕ZŽďĞƌƚŽ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͗ĂǇƚŽŶŝƐĞĂĚ͊>ŽŶŐ>ŝǀĞĂǇƚŽŶ͊͟/ŶPathways  from  Ethnic  Conflict:  Institutional  
Redesign  in  Divided  Societies,  by  John  Coakley,  103.  New  York:  Routledge,  2010.  
26  dŚŽƌƉ͕ƌĂďĞůůĂ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͛ƐWŽůŝƚŝĐĂů^ƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ͘͟h<WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ;:ƵŶĞϮ͕ϮϬϭϭͿ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚĞĐĞŵďĞƌϭϱ͕ϮϬϭϯ͘
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-­‐papers/SN05989/bosnias-­‐political-­‐structures.  
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Although the Office of the High Representative may no longer play such a large role 
today in Bosnian politics, in the past 18 years it has undoubtedly had an impact on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina¶VVWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQ  From 1997 to 2013 it made over 900 decrees.  It was the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VPDLQIRUXPIRUSXVKLQJWhrough legislation that was deemed 
LPSRUWDQWIRU%L+¶VGHYHORSPHQWDVZHOODVZHHGLQJRXWWKHPRVWUDGLFDOSROLWLFLDQVZKRZHUH
deemed to not be in accordance with the Dayton Accords.  Yet these interventionist, illiberal 
means have had longer-term effects.  By using illiberal means to promote liberal democracy, this 
has created a situation where the Bosnian people do not feel fully accountable to the reforms that 
were pushed through by the High Representative.  In addition it has created mistrust of foreign 
intervention in BiH, making it harder for the international community to get involved, the police 
reform in the mid-2000s which is explained further in this paper being a prime example27. 
Criticism of this Government Structure 
There have been many arguments against the way the Dayton Accords set up the new 
political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Richard Caplan describes there being four broad 
structural weaknesses to these accords.  The first is that the way the accords partitioned the 
country two entities has made the reintegration process more difficult as de facto segregation has 
become the norm in the majority of the country.  After the war there were efforts made to return 
refugees to their original homes, but the majority for various reasons never returned.  The second 
weakness is the accords reaffirmed ethnic rather than civic principles of political organization, 
thus actually encouraging ethnic-based political parties with this focus on protecting ethnic rights.  
Third, the Dayton Accords emphasized more military peace than civil peace where there is a lack 
                                                                                                                    
27  ĞůůŽŶŝ͕ZŽďĞƌƚŽ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͗ĂǇƚŽŶŝƐĞĂĚ͊>ŽŶŐ>ŝǀĞĂǇƚŽŶ͊͟/ŶPathways  from  Ethnic  Conflict:  Institutional  
Redesign  in  Divided  Societies,  by  John  Coakley,  103-­‐104.  New  York:  Routledge,  2010.  
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of violence rather than actual understanding and forgiveness between different ethnic groups.  
This has inhibited post-conflict peace building, including the deliverance of justice for all the 
victims of the war.  Finally, the process of economic, social, and political reconstruction was 
accelerated to the point that Caplan when he wrote in 2000 felt it could backfire and undermine 
its own objectives.  Indeed the expediency of which elections were held after the war gave too 
little time to diffuse nationalist sentiments and so it is unsurprising that nationalist parties did 
well28.  All of these weaknesses are challenges that domestic reformers and the international 
community have faced in tryinJWRVWLPXODWH%L+¶VGHYHORSPHQW 
The Dayton Accords was a compromise that made none of the participants truly happy.  
All sides were forced to settle and so while the violence ended, the animosity that generated the 
civil war has never been fully addressed.  The Serbs wanted to secede, some Croats desired their 
own autonomous entity, and Bosniaks wanted a fully unified, centralized state, but as these 
desires were incompatible, none of them got exactly what they wanted.  This has created a 
negative peace where, though there is not wide-spread violence, there is not lasting peace either.  
Distrust between the major ethnic groups is still a big problem within BiH.  That being said, 
while the Dayton Accords have been an important factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina¶V
development, it most certainly has not been the only shaper.  Bosnian politicians, the Bosnian 
people, and international actors have all had a hand in shaping what constitutes this country 
today.  The Dayton Accords are, however, still vitally important and thus in order to understand 
%L+¶VGHYHORSPHQWRQHPXVWXQGHUVWDQGWKHEDFNERQHRIWKLVQDWLRQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWDOV\VWHP 
                                                                                                                    
28  Caplan,  Richard.  "Assessing  the  Dayton  Accord:  The  Structural  Weaknesses  of  the  General  Framework  
Agreement  for  Peace  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Diplomacy  &  Statecraft  11,  no.  2  (July  2000):  222-­‐223.  Academic  
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:KLOHLQLWLDOO\%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VGHYHORSPHQWVHHPHGRYHUDOOSRVLWLYHDVPRUH
time went by it became clearer than ever that %L+¶VFRUHSUREOHPVVWLOOUHPDLQXQUHVROYHG7KH
ELJJHVWSUREOHPRIWKHPDOOLVWKDW³LWUHPDLQVDKRXVHGLYLGHGEHWZHHQLWVFLWL]HQVORFDOHWKQLF
entrepreneurs and the international representatives in the region, each with their own different 
and compHWLQJYLVLRQRIZKDWDµULJKW¶LQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWIRU%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD
VKRXOGORRNOLNH´29  While BiH has other crucial problems that must be addressed like its 
political structure, corruption in the government, and its fragile economy, without cooperation 
between the different ethnic groups this country will remain stagnant in its political development.   
Another problem with the fixation on ethnic politics is that for the national minorities, the 
people who do not belong to one of three main constituent ethnic groups, the current system is 
limiting their rights.  In BiH, Roma consist of the largest minority besides the three main ethnic 
groups.  Because in the Dayton Accords the political system was set up as to protect the rights of 
the Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs, those who are not a part of those groups have been marginalized 
in the political sphere.  This comes from the constitutional definition of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
primarily as³a country of its constituent nations, rather than of its citizens irrespective of their 
national identification´30.  For years these minorities were politically almost invisible until 2002 
when the High Representative stepped in and imposed constitutional amendments, reserving 7 
VHDWVRXWRILQWKH)HGHUDWLRQRI%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶V+RXVHRI3HRSOHVDQGRXWRI
VHDWVLQ5HSXEOLND6USVND¶V&RXQFLORI3Hoples for national minorities31.  However, national 
                                                                                                                    
29  Guzina,  Dejan.  "Dilemmas  of  Nation-­‐building  and  Citizenship  in  Dayton  Bosnia."  National  Identities  9,  no.  3  
(September  2007):  217-­‐234.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  29,  2013).  
30  Guzina,  Dejan.  "Dilemmas  of  Nation-­‐building  and  Citizenship  in  Dayton  Bosnia."  National  Identities  9,  no.  3  
(September  2007):  227.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  29,  2013).  
31  Guzina,  Dejan.  "Dilemmas  of  Nation-­‐building  and  Citizenship  in  Dayton  Bosnia."  National  Identities  9,  no.  3  
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minorities still cannot run for President or for the Federal House of Peoples and still are 
marginalized within society. 
In December 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Bosnia and 
+HU]HJRYLQD¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQYLRODWHGWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRI+XPDQ5LJKWVE\
discriminating against leading members of the Jewish and Roma communities solely based on 
their ethnicity in a landmark case known as Sejdic and F inci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In this 
case the court found the current constitution and electoral laws to be discriminatory and ruled 
that urgent measures must be taken, but so far no action has been taken.  In addition to politics, 
there is also discrimination in thHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFLYLOVHUYLFH%HFDXVHRIHWKQLFTXRWDVPDQ\
times there are no seats left for any people not belonging to one of the three main ethnic groups32.  
For many Bosnian politicians, domestic politics is viewed as a zero-sum game in which 
the ethnic communities are continuously pitted against each other.  Nationalist parties encourage 
this idea so as to consolidate their power among their own ethnic communities.  Bosnians remain 
suspicious of one another to the point where there are young adults that have never left their 
corner of the country.  Many youth from Banja Luka have been to Serbia, but never have 
ventured to Sarajevo.  In Mostar, where Croats, Bosniaks, and a small population of Serbs once 
lived together peacefully, it is now segregated into mainly two ethnic populations divided by the 
river that runs through the city.  Croats live on one side and the Bosniaks live on the other.  
Domestic politics is a very important factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina¶VSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW
but international actors are the focus of this paper. 
                                                                                                                    
32  ͞^ĞĐŽŶĚůĂƐƐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ͗ŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚZŽŵĂ͕:ĞǁƐ͕ĂŶĚKƚŚĞƌEĂƚŝŽŶĂůDŝŶŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŝŶBosnia  and  
,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͘͟Human  Rights  Watch,  2012.  p.2-­‐3.  Accessed  March  1,  2014.  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bosnia0412ForUpload_0_0.pdf  
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Bosnia and Herzegovina has had a difficult 18 years since the end of the Bosnian war.  
While there have been improvements from the initial political system that was created by the 
Dayton Accords, there has yet to be any serious constitutional reform.  Despite the international 
FRPPXQLW\¶VEHVWLQWHQWLRQVDQGHIIRUWVWKXVIDUUHIRUPV of the government have been slow in 
coming and small in scope.  This next section will be taking a step back and looking at state 
consolidation from a broad scope in order to better understand this complex issue. 
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Ch. 1: L iterature Review 
Political development as a field has been studied by many scholars from many angles, but 
state consolidation is an important branch that has received less attention.  State consolidation 
has several aspects.  Jeffrey Herbst in his article³War and the State in Africa´ discusses how 
war has played an KLVWRULFDOUROHLQ(XURSHDQQDWLRQV¶VWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQ7KURXJKZDUVWDWHV
could gather taxes in greater amounts and become more efficient in their functions and 
encourage nationalism which fosters allegiance to the state.  He notes that in Africa states are 
poor, short of trained manpower, and often fragmented.  Bosnia and Herzegovina, while not a 
third-world nation, has many of these same problems, but to a lesser though still important extent.  
Herbst argues that it is immensely difficult outside times of crisis to reform elemental parts of the 
governmental system33.  It is true that Bosnia as a region before 1992 had no history in the 
modern era of total self-governance and thus has not experienced any wars with other countries.  
It is also true that a poor taxation and a lack of unified nationalism contribute to the weakness of 
the Bosnian state, but there are other factors as well.   
While war can be a strong factor in causing people to truly identify with the state, another 
unifier can be rallying people within a nation against the demands of international forces.  For 
Bosnian leaders this could be a valuable technique to unite the country, but the problem remains 
that many Bosnian Serbs and to a lesser extent Bosnian Croats are still at odds with the idea of a 
unified Bosnian state.  If there were a significant outside threat to Bosnia and Herzegovina¶s 
survival perhaps Bosnians would unify, but just international interference is not enough to unify 
SHRSOHLQDFRXQWU\ZKHUHWKH\¶UHVWLOOVRDWRGGVZLWKRQHDQRWKHU 
                                                                                                                    
33  ,ĞƌďƐƚ͕:ĞĨĨƌĞǇ͘͞tĂƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞŝŶĨƌŝĐĂ͘͟International  Security  14,  no.  4  (Spring  1990):  117-­‐39.  
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It is clear that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state lacks legitimacy, an important part of 
state consolidation.  3DWULFN2¶1HLOGHILQHVOHJLWLPDF\DV³DYDOXHZKHUHE\VRPHWKLQJRU
VRPHRQHLVUHFRJQL]HGDQGDFFHSWHGDVULJKWDQGSURSHU´34  In other words, an institution is 
legitimate when it is widely recognized and accepted by the public.  Through legitimacy that 
institution gains authority and thus power.  When people recognize the authority of a government, 
they are more likely to follow its laws, even when the threat of punishment is slight because it is 
YLHZHGDVWKH³ULJKWWKLQJWRGR´  People with faith in their government are more likely to pay 
taxes, abide by laws and regulations, and be a politically active and engaged citizen.  Today 
many ethnic nationalists in Bosnia do not claim the Bosnian identity and do not recognize the 
legitimacy of the federal government.  To secessionist Serbs and Croats, only the Bosniaks and 
the International Community truly want BiH to exist.  This means that for many Bosnians, the 
Serb Republic or their cantonal government is more legitimate than the federal government.  
How has this lack of legitimacy of the federal government come about?  Besides the obvious 
answer of ethnic nationalism, the OHR and other international actors clearly have effected in the 
legitimacy of the Bosnian government through their projects and conditions on aid. 
Beyond legitimacy, there are other important factors that affect state consolidation.  
Sovereignty35 plays a vital part in that it ³DIILUPVWKHVHSDUDWHLGHQWLW\RIDVRFLDOXQLWDQG
suggests that its persistence is not primarily a function of directive action from other institutional 
VSKHUHV´36  From this definition alone it is clear how important autonomy is for BiH to develop 
as a state.  Yet there is a gap beWZHHQWKHQDWLRQ¶VUHDOVRYHUHLJQW\DQGLWVSHUFHLYHGVRYHUHignty.  
                                                                                                                    
34  O'Neil,  Patrick  H.  Essentials  of  Comparative  Politics.  3rd  ed.  New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  &  Company,  2009.  35.  
35  Van  Willigen  uses  autonomy  in  place  of  sovereignty  in  his  article;  however  for  the  sake  of  clarity  sovereignty  
shall  be  used  instead.  
36  van  Willigen,  Niels.  "International  Administration  and  Institutional  Autonomy  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  
Kosovo."  East  European  Politics  28,  no.  4  (December  2012):  432.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  17,  2013).  
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In terms of the definition provided by van Willigen, Bosnia and Herzegovina has definitely 
achieved more independence from international control in the last 18 years, but it has yet to 
become sovereign as it has not achieved complete independence as long as the OHR still exists 
in BiH.  While the Office of the High Representative still exists, its actions have dramatically 
decreased in number and frequency since 2005.  The main issue is that while the international 
community has begun to draw out of BiH, the domestic government has not stepped in to fill in 
the gap in leadership.  As stated previously, in earlier years when the Office of the 
Representative was playing a larger role in the country, domestic politicians would be in 
continuous gridlock, knowing that the High Representative would step in to push through its own 
version of whatever bill was being debated37.  Thus, domestic politicians were allowed to vote 
along ethnic nationalist lines without having to deal with the consequences.  Today the High 
Representative has only a minimal presence in Bosnian domestic politics and as such the 
Parliament when it comes to passing important laws has become gridlocked, particularly when it 
comes to constitutional reform. 
7KHSUREOHPLVWKDWZKLOH%L+¶VLnstitutional independence has increased, its institutional 
capacity KDVQRW9DQ:LOOLJHQGHILQHVLQVWLWXWLRQDOFDSDFLW\DV³WKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQV
RUWKHDELOLW\RIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVWRµSODQDQGH[HFXWHSROLFLHVDQGWRHQIRUFHODZVFOHDQO\DQd 
WUDQVSDUHQWO\¶´ ZKLOHWKH:RUOG%DQNGHILQHVLWDV³WKHTXDOLW\RISXEOLFVHUYLFHVWKHTXDOLW\RI
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility oIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRVXFK
                                                                                                                    
37  van  Willigen,  Niels.  "International  Administration  and  Institutional  Autonomy  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  
Kosovo."  East  European  Politics  28,  no.  4  (December  2012):  437.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  17,  2013).  
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SROLFLHV´38  )URPWKHVHWZRGHILQLWLRQVLWLVFOHDUWKDW%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VJRYHUQPHQW
while having a good amount of institutional independence, does not have much institutional 
capacity.  With the government in near-constant gridlock, the government cannot be effective 
and thus is weak in capacity. 
Capacity-building, a component of state-building, has a longer history than most realize, 
dating back to the colonial era when it was used as an excuse by colonizers to seize control of a 
particular DUHDLQRUGHUWR³FLYLOL]H´LW.  Going into the 1950s, state-building became a part of the 
Cold War.  Development funds were used as a tool to sway countries to one side or the other.  In 
the post-Cold War era, state-building, particularly political development, has taken a new turn 
when it comes to post-conflict nations.  Organizations like the UN have moved beyond just 
disarmament and setting up basic infrastructure for a new government.  New issues like capacity-
building and developing the programs that provide basic services for citizens have become more 
important39.  However, while development as a whole has been much written about, long-term 
political development has not received as much attention as more immediate concerns like 
reconstruction or economic development.  Western-based international actors clearly have a long 
history of capacity-EXLOGLQJFRQWLQXLQJWRWKHSUHVHQWZLWKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶V
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
2¶1HLOOGHVFULEHs capacity more tangibly as something where citizens feel secure and 
safe in their nation, the legislature is able to pass laws at an appropriate pace, schools and roads 
                                                                                                                    
38  van  Willigen,  Niels.  "International  Administration  and  Institutional  Autonomy  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  
Kosovo."  East  European  Politics  28,  no.  4  (December  2012):  434.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  17,  2013).  
39  Roberts,  David.  "Post-­‐conflict  Statebuilding  and  State  Legitimacy:  From  Negative  to  Positive  
Peace?"  Development  &  Change39,  no.  4  (July  2008):  539-­‐40.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  22,  2013).  
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are built, and those who break the law are punished.40  Yet, how the international community can 
increase the capacity of a nation is the billion-dollar question.  One way the international 
FRPPXQLW\WULHVWRLQFUHDVHDVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\LVE\XVLQJµOHQGLQJFRQGLWLRQDOLW\¶7KLVLQYROYHV
putting conditions on aid, like having certain percentages of it go to particular government 
programming like health care for children.  The conditions could also pressure the government to 
implement reforms in areas it is funding. This tactic is contentious because it has had varied 
success, with results differing in different countries, and because it can seem neo-imperialist in 
intention depending on what the conditions are.41 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative is an unusual, location-
specific method which the international community has used to promote state capacity.  The 
OHR was used to ensure the stability of the Dayton Accords in the first few years.  More 
importantly, it also increased state capacity by intervening directly in Bosnian politics when it 
felt was necessary42.  While this direct method can indeed increase state capacity, it also can 
LQWHUIHUHZLWKDVWDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQW\DQGPDNHWKHFLWL]HQVRIWKDWQDWLRQIHHOOHVVFRQQHFWHGWR
their government.  In essence, under the OHR Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a protectorate, a 
state under partial or full international administration.  Van Willigen argues one way to deal with 
this issue of lack of sovereignty is to gradually transfer government functions from the 
international level to the domestic level43.  As the number of interventions declines, paralleling 
the OHR backing off from Bosnian politics starting frRPWKHVWDWH¶VDXWRQRP\ increases.  
                                                                                                                    
40  O'Neil,  Patrick  H.  Essentials  of  Comparative  Politics.  3rd  ed.  New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  &  Company,  2009.  40.  
41  Roberts,  David.  "Post-­‐conflict  Statebuilding  and  State  Legitimacy:  From  Negative  to  Positive  
Peace?"  Development  &  Change39,  no.  4  (July  2008):  548.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  22,  2013).  
42  ĞůůŽŶŝ͕ZŽďĞƌƚŽ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͗ĂǇƚŽŶŝƐĞĂĚ͊>ŽŶŐ>ŝǀĞĂǇƚŽŶ͊͟/ŶPathways  from  Ethnic  Conflict:  Institutional  
Redesign  in  Divided  Societies,  by  John  Coakley,  103.  New  York:  Routledge,  2010.  
43  van  Willigen,  Niels.  "International  Administration  and  Institutional  Autonomy  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  
Kosovo."  East  European  Politics  28,  no.  4  (December  2012):  433.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  17,  2013).  
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Today the OHR is barely involved, but as long as it still exists Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot 
be called a fully sovereign nation as the potential for an OHR intervention is always looming. 
Van Willigen offers another method international actors can use to intervene in order to 
increase the capacity of a weak state.  As institutions are a critical component of any government, 
the international community can make a deal with the government, or directly intervene when 
the state is a protectorate like BiH, to create, develop, and/or reform institutions which are 
considered to be the most important in stabilizing and improving the post-conflict nation.  One 
example of this is the OHR and European Commission creating the Police Restructuring 
&RPPLVVLRQLQRUGHUWRUHIRUP%L+¶VSROLFHIRUFH  The reform of the police force was vitally 
important because it was known for being corrupt and ethnically biased.  However, the 
Commission had mixed success, not achieving all the reforms it wanted due to push back from 
Bosnian politicians.  One other method of improving institutions is offering training services for 
the civil service.44 
Shahar Hameiri defines state capacity as it used by the most predominant international 
actors aV³«UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJDQREMHFWLYHDQGWHFKQLFDOPHDVXUHRISHUIRUPDQFHWKDWFDQEH
µEXLOW¶>LW@HVVHQWLDOO\FRQVWLWXWHVDSROLWLFDODQGLGHRORJLFDOPHFKDQLVPIor operationalizing 
SURMHFWVRIVWDWHWUDQVQDWLRQDOLVP´45  He argues capacity building is used to pressure domestic 
governments to use a particular set of social and political relationships and institutional 
arrangements that are supportive of these relations.  In particular, this pressure is used to 
implement neoliberal economic and liberal political policies.   
                                                                                                                    
44  van  Willigen,  Niels.  "International  Administration  and  Institutional  Autonomy  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  
Kosovo."  East  European  Politics  28,  no.  4  (December  2012):  434.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  17,  2013).  
45  Hameiri,  Shahar.  "Capacity  and  its  Fallacies:  International  State  Building  as  State  Transformation."  Millennium  
(03058298)  38,  no.  1  (August  2009):  57.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  22,  2013).  
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This critique is powerful especially when considering the neoliberal reforms that came 
with the package of the Dayton Accords that included mandates for privatization of many 
industries the government owned (left over from when it had been a part of the Communist 
Yugoslavia) and the creation of an open-market economy46.  While BiH is under the umbrella of 
European nations that have more Social Democratic political cultures, it is not immune to 
neoliberal policies.  Tuzla is a famous case where the privatization of factories led to a loss of 
jobs which has led to this toZQ¶VKLJKXQHPSOR\PHQWHYHQ\HDUVODWHUEXW7X]ODLV
representative of the bigger woes of Bosnia and Herzegovina: namely a lack of jobs that has led 
many Bosnians to leave the country in search of work. 
Hameiri also argues that state-building programs have been very difficult to implement 
and often have not achieved the expected development milestones or alleviation of violent 
conflict in many fragile or failed states.  Indeed, in many nations capacity-building programs 
have failed.  Hameiri argues that one reason for these failures is that instead of establishing a 
formula for governance as international actors said they will, instead they often end up relying on 
stopgap measures to put out spot-fires where they emerge such as focusing on the reform of a 
particularly egregious ministry within the government rather than.  In many cases these measures 
may actually hinder sustainable political development47.  Short-term measures have been used in 
many countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina as they solve immediate problem and are 
easier to produce tangible results while longer-term measures have been used less as they are not 
as urgent nor as they as easily quantifiable.  This argument for the case of BiH, based on 
preliminary evidence may be a contributinJIDFWRUWRWKLVQDWLRQ¶VODFNRISROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW 
                                                                                                                    
46  Mirascic,  Goran.  "Current  Economic  Situation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Journal  of  International  &  Global  
Studies  3,  no.  1  (November  2011):  33.  Academic  Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  17,  2013).  
47  Hameiri,  Shahar.  "Capacity  and  its  Fallacies:  International  State  Building  as  State  Transformation."  Millennium  
(03058298)  38,  no.  1  (August  2009):  56.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  22,  2013).  
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For many international actors the Organization for Economic Coordination and 
Development (OECD) is held up as the standard for Western ideals of development which is 
defined as a liberal constitutional democracy based on an industrialized or post-industrialized 
market economy.  David Roberts, a researcher on post-conflict transition, argues against the 
OLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\QRUPVVWDWLQJ³2QHRIWKHZHDNHVWEXWPRVWLPSRUWDQWOLQNVLQVWDWH-building 
LVWKHFUHDWLRQRIDVWDEOHGRPHVWLFHQYLURQPHQWLQFRXQWULHVHPHUJLQJIURPZDUV´48  While the 
military and other disciplinary arms of the state need to function, it should not distract from the 
importance of stabilizing the relationship between the state and its larger society.  One way of 
doing this is by connecting them through provision of essential social services49.  Another 
important point to develop is citizenship.  When people feel loyalty to a federal state then they 
recognize the legitimacy of it and will be more likely to actively participate in it.  This sense of 
citizenship comes from a number of things: shared history and experiences, shared culture, and 
shared language and ethnic identity are just a few potential sources.   
Another expert, Kalu, argues that when international actors fail at developing a nation it 
does not necessarily result in a failed state, but an inadequate product of failed institutions.  The 
building up of capable institutions is a vital part of state-building and political development and 
in order for those institutions to be credible, people must believe themselves to be citizens of that 
system.  CitizenVKLSFRQQHFWVSHRSOHWRWKHLUJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKXVEHFRPHV³DQRUGHULQJGHYLFH
                                                                                                                    
48  Roberts,  David.  "Post-­‐conflict  Statebuilding  and  State  Legitimacy:  From  Negative  to  Positive  Peace?"  p.    
552.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  22,  2013).  
49  Roberts,  David.  "Post-­‐conflict  Statebuilding  and  State  Legitimacy:  From  Negative  to  Positive  Peace?"  p.    
552.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  22,  2013).  
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WKDWGHILQHVWKHVFRSHDQGERXQGDULHVRIZKDWLVRULVQRWSHUPLVVLEOHLQWKHODUJHUFRPPXQLW\´50  
Through the norms that citizenship creates, a healthy civic culture can then be promoted. 
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, reconciliation and political development need to go hand-
in-hand.  It is impossible to have a healthy democracy in this nation unless the different ethnic 
groups come to some agreement to live together under a unified state.  In this matter NGOs, both 
domestic and international, have played an important part in developing programs at the local 
level to promote reconciliation, even if it is indirectly.  Dejan Guzina, a scholar of nation-
building in BiH, remarks on how Bosnia has been an experimental ground for all kinds of 
techniques dealing with inter-ethnic conflict ranging from efforts at partition to multicultural 
integration.  Guzina argues that the international community has tried to implement liberal 
solutions to BiH, but at the same time de facto segregation, the imposition of majority culture 
customs and lifestyles, the denial of civic and political rights to minorities, and so on remain in 
full force.  Crucially, he argues, while international actors try to keep to their liberal development 
agenda, for better or for worse in the long run they must cooperate with local leaders who have 
different policy ideas51.   
International Actors have played an exceptionally large role in Bosnia and Her]HJRYLQD¶V
state consolidation, ranging from the development and signing of the Dayton Accords to the 
massive amount of funding and number of programs that were dedicated to the country once the 
ZDUHQGHG%L+¶VVLWXDWLRQGLIIHUVIURP much of the post-conflict literature discussed previously 
because it is not a nation just emerging from a conflict; it is by now an 18-year-old nation.  Thus 
                                                                                                                    
50  Kalu,  Kalu  N.  "Institution-­‐building,  Not  Nation-­‐building:  a  Structural-­‐Functional  Model."  International  Review  of  
Administrative  Sciences  77,  no.  1  (March  2011):  133-­‐34.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  
September  22,  2013).  
51  Guzina,  Dejan.  "Dilemmas  of  Nation-­‐building  and  Citizenship  in  Dayton  Bosnia."  National  Identities  9,  no.  3  
(September  2007):  230-­‐31.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  29,  2013).  
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issues of political development must be addressed in the long-term.  To that end some scholars 
have hypothesized about what VKRXOGEHIRFXVHGIRU%L+¶VORQJ-term development.  On this 
topic, Eric Martin has argued that cross-sectoral trust and legitimacy should be built up, 
institutions strengthened, self-regulation introduced, operationalizing civil society building, and 
encouraging ownership should all be focused on more by both international and domestic actors 
in BiH52.  When analyzing how international actors have promoted capacity-building, these ideas 
are useful to quantify specific areas of state consolidation and make it easier to understand. 
One area of political development that is not discussed as often is the role of civil society.  
:KLOHFLYLOVRFLHW\PD\QRWKDYHDJUHDWLPSDFWRQ%RVQLD¶VVWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQLWLVDQ
important part of the development of the state as a whole.  Building up the civil society gets 
citizens more engaged both locally and with their governments.  In addition civil society makes 
up an important part of the peace-building process which is absolutely vital to any long-term 
solution for BiH to thrive. In this nation, it is more common for Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian 
Croats to identify as Serb or Croat than as a Bosnian.  These ethnic identities for many Bosnians 
very much impacts their lives as de facto segregation is widespread53. 
Non-Governmental Actors such as Amnesty International are unique in that they have no 
default ethnic ties.  They are suited to incorporate Bosnians of all backgrounds into their 
programs and to promote reconciliation as an important step to state consolidation.  There has 
been some improvement in ethnic relations, but without reconciliation, ethnic politics will 
FRQWLQXHWRGRPLQDWH%RVQLDQSROLWLFVWKXVERJJLQJGRZQWKHQDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRJURZDQG
                                                                                                                    
52  Martin,  Eric  C.  "Nation  Building  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  Cooperation,  Coordination  and  Collaboration."  South  
East  European  Journal  of  Economics  &  Business  (1840118X)  2,  no.  2  (November  2007):  7-­‐22.  Business  Source  
Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  22,  2013).  
53  Clark,  Janine  Natalya.  "Missing  Persons,  Reconciliation  and  the  View  from  Below:  A  Case  Study  of  Bosnia-­‐
Hercegovina."  Journal  of  Southeast  European  &  Black  Sea  Studies  10,  no.  4  (December  2010):  426.  Academic  
Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  June  26,  2013).  
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change.  Unfortunately, NGOs in BiH are often very small and under-funded with many of them 
completely reliant on foreign aid as there are few sources of income for them within the state and 
due to their foreign funding, many Bosnians distrust them.  Thus, at this moment, domestic 
NGOs have proven thus far to be ineffectual at promoting any large-scale change54. 
For this thesis a number of variables will be looked at in order to judge why the 
international FRPPXQLW\¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDKDVQRWVXFFHHded in creating 
a stronger federal government despite how much money, time, and effort has been pumped into 
it for the last 18 years.  The dependent variable will be state consolidation.  The independent 
variables are institutional capacity in regards to public services like education, health care, and 
provision of goods and services, legitimacy of the federal government, and economic 
development. 
There are many other variables present when it comes to determining why BiH as a state 
has not been successfully consolidated and made effective including nationalism and the 
nationalist domestic parties currently dominating the political sphere, corruption in the 
government, and more, but those topics have had more scholarship which is why this paper is 
focused on the realm of international actors.  The Office of the High Representative and the role 
of the international community in directly influencing the governance of this nation played a 
KXJHO\LPSRUWDQWUROHLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VSRVW-conflict political development.  A whole 
separate paper could be written just on that topic which is why I am choosing to focus on the 
variables of international projects and conditionality.   
                                                                                                                    
54  McMahon,  Patrice.  "International  NGOs  and  Peacebuilding."  Conference  Papers  -­‐-­‐  International  Studies  
Association  (2010  Annual  Meeting  2010):  1.  Political  Science  Complete,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  December  17,  2013).  
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To that end I have two hypotheses.  My first hypothesis is this: the international 
community, while it has largely succeeded in reconstructing much of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
has failed in creating an effective federal state because the projects that were created and funded 
by various International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and nation-states have been 
ineffective because there has not been enough projects focused on the core of %L+¶VSUREOHPV
ethnic tension and an inefficient government.  My second hypothesis is that the international 
FRPPXQLW\¶VFRQGLWLRQDOLW\WKDWFRPHVZLWKDLd and the conditions that are part of the process of 
accession into the EU have been ineffective as catalysts for real reforms and change because of 
the difficulty of changing a political system and because there is not a consensus within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to make these changes. 
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Chapter 2: Evidence 
Reconstruction and development for Europeans and other Western countries like the US 
was a matter of pride as BiH was the first real war and genocide in Europe after WWII.  Though 
genocide has happened all over the world, for the Western world Bosnia and Herzegovina was an 
exceptional case because it happened in their backyard and they watched it happen on their TVs, 
exposing them to the horrors in a new way.  To that end a disproportionate amount of aid was 
IXQQHOHGLQWR%L+¶VGHYHORSPent when compared to other post-conflict states.  From 1996 to 
2007 alone some $14 billion55 in foreign assistance flooded into the nation of less than 4 million 
people amounting to about $300 per person per year.  From 1991-2013 the EU alone gave over 
3.2 billion Euros in aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  While at first large amounts of aid were 
poured into the country, as time progressed interest waned in the country, but did not completely 
dissipate.  Aid money began to dry up, but international actors like the US government and the 
EU have remained active in development projects. 
Today, the largest donor in BiH is the European Union (EU).  Other key multilateral 
donors include the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European 
Investment Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations agencies.  Other main bilateral donors 
include the United States, Sweden, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, and Japan, but there 
remain still many other actors and organizations involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The 
international aid sector in BiH thus remains complex with so many actors involved in its 
development. 
 
                                                                                                                    
55  The  numbers  for  this  amount  vary  considerably  as  it  is  difficult  to  track  the  money  from  so  many  different  
sources  and  BiH  has  not  kept  consistent  records  on  the  aid  money  it  has  been  given.    For  example,  USAID  
estimates  the  total  amount  from  1996-­‐2012  to  be  closer  to  $8  billion.  
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I. Methodology 
USAID is a wing of the US government used for giving international aid while 
Europe$LGLVWKH(8¶VHTXLYDOHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQ  The US along with the EU are two of the top 
aid-givers in the world and as such are very influential in the international development arena.  
For this reason and due to time constraints these two organizations were chosen to be the focus 
of my research, though there are many other nation-states, international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) like the UN, and non-governmental organizations involved in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina¶V development as a whole.  It is true that individual nations, IGOs, and NGOs all 
have played important roles in BiH. 
In order to investigate how international actors have indeed aIIHFWHG%L+¶VSROLWLFDO
development I researched what projects these organizations have funded throughout the years in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  To that end my primary sources were the official websites for USAID, 
EuropeAid, and the Delegation of the EU to BiH though some data was gathered via official e-
mail correspondence with an EU employee.  I recognize that in the case of government agencies, 
the data procured via this method may not be completely unbiased, particularly in reporting 
results of these projects, but even in NGOs there can always be some bias as aid organizations 
must put forward a good face for donators. 
Unfortunately, my data for USAID is incomplete as the information available on 
86$,'¶VZHEVLWHZDVLQFRPSOHWH  The data gathered from this organization spans only as far 
back as 2009, detailing only current USAID projects.  For future research with additional time 
this gap in research would be filled in, but due to time constraints that is not possible at this time.  
In addition, only projects related to political development and state consolidation have been 
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included in this research.  There are many other projects that might have some tangential effect 
on the political sphere like economic projects, but as they are not directly related they will not be 
included. 
The biggest problem faced in this research was a lack of available information.  While 
gathering data I noted that the data I was gathering from the EU was most often just summaries 
of the projects with few details as to actual implementation, results, and effectiveness.  USAID, 
on the other hand, does have information available about implementation and results, but as most 
of the projects it has listed online are current projects, the results are only projected.  Neither 
USAID nor the EU has reports easily found online on the effectiveness of their past projects.  In 
the course of my research I found one report which was written by the EU on their EAP Project 
which ran from 1995-1998, over 15 years ago and a few other reports by USAID found on 
independent website.  Finally, because of the vagueness of much of the data I gathered, the 
wording for portions of these results is also, unfortunately, rather vague as well.  With more data 
this could be rectified, but due to time constraints that must be left to future research. 
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II. USAID 
The United States has been involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina since even before the 
end of the war in the country.  The US first played an important role in NATO which aided the 
Bosniaks in fighting the Serbs using surveillance drones and missile strikes.  Then the US was a 
major player in the formation of the Dayton Accords, the accords being named after where they 
were signed in Dayton, Ohio.  Since then the US has remained involved in country in various 
ways spanning across all sectors.  Today, USAID has two main stated goals: improved 
democracy and governance, thus creating more functional and accountable institutions and actors 
WKDWPHHWFLWL]HQV¶QHHGVDQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK 
While information for specific projects for USAID is incomplete, there is more general 
information available about some projects USAID has completed in the past.  In terms of rule of 
law, USAID assisted BiH policymakers with the adoption and implementation of the Law on 
Freedom of Information, a law in which any citizen can fill out a form to request information 
from the government and it must be answered in a timely fashion, though that is not always the 
case.  This law has the potential to increase the legitimacy of the government if information 
about it is spread so that it is more widely used and responses to requests are answered more 
promptly, but at this time it is not. 
USAID and the US Government also assisted in the creation of the High Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council which acts as a unified oversight of judges, prosecutors, and court 
administration; they also helped with the process of reappointing judges, prosecutors, and 
strengthening the council secretariat.  USAID also has helped 32 courts in BiH to implement 
court improvement plans which included remodeled courthouses and buying audio equipment to 
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record hearings.  These judicial reforms are an important step towards improving institutional 
capacity and legitimacy, but as will be discussed later, BiH still has a ways to go. 
One important project for improving government goods and services that USAID 
completed in the past with collaboration from the Swedish and Dutch governments was the 
Governance Accountability Project which helped local governments to create One-Stop Shops 
which help them provide better services to their citizens by creating one location in an area for 
citizens to access goods and services of the government that they need.  Where these One-Stop 
Shops have been successfully implemented, there have been reduced waiting times, increased 
efficiency, and improved transparency, thus burgeoning %L+¶VFDSDFLW\ 
USAID has also been involved in supporting Bosnian and international NGOs in order to 
help develop BiH.  From 1999-2004 USAID had a program known as Democracy Network 
(Demnet) which supported Bosnian NGOs to improve their supervisory skills and to become 
better service providers.  By the time the program ended in 2004, $7.6 million dollars had been 
spent to assist over 130 NGOs with grants, training, and technical assistance.  While these NGOs 
KDYHQRWLPSURYHG%L+¶VVWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQWKHre are many NGOs that deal with youth 
engagement and political engagement like KULT.  KULT works on political and peacebuilding 
education of youth to enable them to become active and engaged members of their communities. 
As well as training young people, this organization builds strong partnerships with local 
authorities and the wider community to ensure the long-term sustainability of their projects.  
Thus indirectly NGOs can be a powerful force for encouraging citizens to get more politically 
engaged or even run for office.  These people may then spark positive change in the government. 
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7RGD\86$,'KDVWZRPDLQSURJUDPVGHDOLQJZLWK%L+¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\WKH&LYLF
Advocacy Partnership Program (CAPP) which works directly with Bosnian NGOs and the NGO 
Sector Sustainability Program.  7KURXJK86$,'¶VDLGWZR%RVQLDQ1*2VLQSDUWLFXODUWKH
Center for Civic Initiatives (CCI) and the Civil Society Promotion Center (CPCD) are considered 
to be the best NGOs in the country by most major international donors56.  CCI is focused on 
improving the democratic process through monitoring and analyzing the performance of 
government institutions as well as providing training to other civic groups and NGOs and 
working to improve citizen participation in government.  CPCD much like its name suggests is 
IRFXVHGRQSURPRWLQJ%RVQLD¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\, working directly with other NGOs to aid them and 
help them improve. 
An independent report of civil society programs from 2008 found that overall NGOs in 
BiH are still mostly small organizations working on a project to project basis.  This report 
recommends that Bosnian NGOs need to establish better networks to improve effectiveness of 
campaigns as well as strengthen movements, government officials at all levels need to be 
educated about NGOs so they can work better together, more projects need to address problems 
at the stDWHOHYHOQRWMXVWORFDODQGWKHUHQHHGVWREHPRUH³VHFRQGJHQHUDWLRQDGYRFDF\´WKDWLV
advocates for social and political issues that are Bosnians57. 
Two American NGOs that USAID has directly supported that have state consolidation 
programs in BiH are the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican 
Institute (IRI).  The NDI has worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina VLQFH7KLVRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
                                                                                                                    
56  Evaluation  of  Civil  Society  Programs  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  Final  report.  Washington,  DC:  Management  
Systems  International.  2008.  p.  7.  Accessed  April  5,  2014.  
http://www.ecnl.org.hu/dindocuments/204_Bosnia%20Civil%20Society%20Report%2007-­‐04-­‐08%20%20FINAL.pdf.  
57  Evaluation  of  Civil  Society  Programs  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina:  Final  report.  Washington,  DC:  Management  
Systems  International.  2008.  p.  8-­‐10.  Accessed  April  5,  2014.  
http://www.ecnl.org.hu/dindocuments/204_Bosnia%20Civil%20Society%20Report%2007-­‐04-­‐08%20%20FINAL.pdf.  
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focus is supporting political reform at the highest-levels and at the grassroots level.  To that end 
NDI has had three main programs.  The Democratic Initiative for Europe is an ethnically and 
politically diverse group of elected officials who draw on civil society expertise to propose 
legislation of election reform, whistleblowing, and other anti-corruption issues.  NDI also uses 
public opinion research to help political parties target the issues that citizens at the local level 
care about including social services, education, health care, and agriculture.  Finally, NDI 
organized debates for mayoral candidates prior to the 2012 elections58. 
The International Republican Institute is the other main American NGO that USAID 
supports which focuses on the political development of BiH.  IRI works in three main areas: 
supporting democratic reform and accountability within political parties, assisting local 
communities and civil society in improving advocacy efforts by regular citizens using lobbying 
tactics directed at decision makers in political parties, and fostering the inclusion of women and 
youth in the political process.  More specifically, IRI partners with local governments in order to 
strengthen government institutions so they can better deliver goods and services and construct 
better outreach strategies to engage citizens from various ethnic and political backgrounds.  IRI 
is also organizing a series of workshops on democratic governance practices for mayors and 
councilors with the aim to promote³accountability, transparency, efficiency and 
responsiveness´59 
In order to address the complDFHQF\RI%L+¶VSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVZKLFKXQGHUWKHFXUUHQW
system have little incentive to pass reforms, IRI also promotes independent, non-party 
individuals and civic organizations that can present sound policy proposals, communicate them 
                                                                                                                    
58  EĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͘͟ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂƌĐŚϭϬ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘https://www.ndi.org/bosnia  
59  International  ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͘͟ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂƌĐŚϭϬ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
http://www.iri.org/countries-­‐and-­‐programs/europe/bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina.  
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to the public, and organize citizens to encourage parties to embrace these policies.  Thus IRI 
works from both inside and outside the political system and the political parties in order to 
encourage political UHIRUP,5,DOVRKDVDVWURQJFRPPLWPHQWWRLPSURYLQJZRPHQ¶VSolitical 
participation.  Currently politics in BiH is a male-dominated institution and Bosnian society 
reflects traditional gender stereotypes of women as mothers and wives.  Only 17% of elected 
officials are women.  ,5,KDVSDUWQHUHGZLWKWKH:RPHQ¶V'HPRcracy Network, a Bosnian NGO, 
which empowers women in politics and provides networks and programing for them to prepare 
for careers as political leaders.  It also works directly with female politicians in order to create 
VWURQJZRPHQ¶VRUJDQL]DWLRQVZLWKLQ political parties60.   
One Bosnian organization USAID has directly supported is the Center for Civic 
Initiatives which organized two elections that allowed parents to elect primary school principals 
in Tuzla and Kalesij, the first elections of this kind.  CCI also leads other programs aimed at 
increasing the accountability of the BiH government and politicians.  Another aspect of politics 
USAID is focused on is improving bottom-up communication within political parties, increasing 
outreach and transparency, and improving focus on real issues through public opinion research. 
Plus, USAID has also provided training of all election administrators and provided up to 5,000 
domestic observers in various elections.  Finally, USAID helped Bosnia and Herzegovina¶V6tate 
and Entity parliaments to increase efficiency of caucuses and committees through improving 
rules of procedures.  In addition, with USAID support, parliaments increased their capacity to 
reach out to constituents by organizing open-day events and public hearings, and introduced an 
internship program. 
                                                                                                                    
60  /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͘͟ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂƌĐŚϭϬ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
http://www.iri.org/countries-­‐and-­‐programs/europe/bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina.  
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,QWHUPVRIHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW86$,'¶VPDLQREMHFWLYHLV³DFRPSHWLWLYHPDUNHW-
RULHQWHGHFRQRP\SURYLGLQJEHWWHUHFRQRPLFRSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUDOOLWVFLWL]HQV´61  More 
specifically, USAID seeks to improve economic opportunities and to promote a more business-
friendly environment by supporting efforts to increase competitiveness and productivity, attract 
investment, and make economic policy reforms.  The sectors USAID is targeting most are: 
agriculture, wood products, tourism, and light manufacturing.    Overall, USAID also has 
programming targeted at reducing or eliminating barriers for businesses to be established or 
thrive, establishing a more transparent tax system, creating a reliable energy regulatory 
environment, and promoting transparent banking, investment, and insurance policies. 
USAID Projects 
USAID has 6 current or recent projects promoting institutional capacity and legitimacy, 4 
projects promoting reconciliation, 2 projects promoting community development, 8 projects 
promoting economic development, 1 project focusing on human rights and 1 project focusing on 
independent media for a total of 22 projects.  The total value of these 22 projects is 
$156,151,596.00, with most of the funding coming from USAID, but also some additional funds 
from partnerships with other organizations and governments.  Below are summaries of the 
strategies USAID is using with its current projects (ranging from 2009-present), grouped by 
relevant theme. 
Institutional Capacity and Legitimacy:  
- Political Processes Support Program: Training members of political parties and supporting 
pluralism in political parties and civil society based on policies that address economic and social 
issues rather than ethnicity. 
                                                                                                                    
61  h^/͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͗ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ'ƌŽǁƚŚ͘͟DĂƌĐŚϲ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂƌĐŚϭϬ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
http://www.usaid.gov/bosnia/economic-­‐growth  
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- Anti-&RUUXSWLRQ&LYLF2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶8QLILHG1HWZRUN (A C C O UN T): Working with civil 
society, media, and other anti-corruption stakeholders to create a unified anti-corruption network, 
develop new anti-corruption legislation and policies, and to create widely known and safe 
avenues for reporting on corruption. 
- Civil Society Sustainability Project: 'HYHORSLQJ%L+¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\ by partnering with 10-12 
NGOs so they can create better ties with the government and other key stake-holders so as to 
improve civic engagement in policy development, implementation, and oversight. 
- Engaging C ivil Society in Constitutional Reform: Working with civil society leaders, 
grassroots activists, NGOs, and key stakeholders to help them develop a citizen-driven 
movement for BiH constitutional reform to address ethnic division.  This has included training 
15 local civil society groups. 
- Strengthening Governing Institutions and Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
SWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHFDSDFLW\RIWKHFRXQWU\¶VJRYHUQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVWRDGRSWLPSOHPHQWDQG
account for more effective policies, laws, and budgets that address critical EU accession related 
issues.  This has been done through hands-on technical assistance with members of government 
including the executive branch and will also include increasing government ties with civil 
society and the BiH policy community. 
There are four main components to this program: improving policy development; improving 
budget preparation, review, adoption and implementation; strengthening systems of public 
accountability and transparency; and enhancing the role and capacity of women in government. 
- Justice Sector Development: Building an effective and credible judiciary in BiH by 
strengthening the independence, accountability, and effectiveness of its judicial institution and 
by partnering with the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), the Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ), courts, and pURVHFXWRUV¶RIILFHV 
Percentage of Total Aid: 18% (~$28.49 million) 
Community Development: 
- Strengthening Accountability of Women and Young Political Leaders: Increasing the 
engagement of women and youth in political processes by increasing their knowledge of politics, 
and providing them with opportunities to engage in the public and political life of BiH.  This has 
been and will continue to be done through cross-party seminars and workshops on EU accession, 
economic and social development, international relations, leadership, and management. 
- Peacing the Future Together (Youthbanks): Supporting BiH youth in community 
development activities including hands-on opportunities to build project management skills 
working on youth-led community service initiatives including refurbishing a kindergarten 
playground. 
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Percentage of Total Aid: 2% (~$3.13 million) 
Reconciliation: 
- T rust-Understanding-Responsibility for the Future: Providing opportunities for leaders and 
citizens of BiH to challenge and transform their own beliefs about one another, and then start 
transforming their communities.  This includes trainings, peace camps, speaking-out events, 
cultural events, small grants, and community initiatives targeting 30 municipalities- 15 pairs of 
communities that have been divided along ethnic lines.  This project will also engage Bosnian 
leaders so that they might serve as role models for citizens. 
- Peace Education on Location: Promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation by supporting joint 
activities for youth of different ethnic, political, and religious backgrounds to help citizens 
understand and accept ethno-religious differences that present an impediment to lasting peace, 
reconciliation, and development in BiH.  This will include the development and testing of an 
education training package that local community leaders and representatives of centers and 
networks that deal with war crime sites and victims in both entities will help to develop and 
implement. 
- Education for a Just Society: Changing the educational system in BiH to reflect a vision of a 
society that promotes peace and reconciliation, and encourages all BiH children to envision and 
build their future, including the revision of curricular materials, integrated settings, and 
alternative pedagogical methods.  This program will involve school principals and teachers from 
18 communities participating in intensive training and mentoring.  In addition, the teachers and 
30 trainers will develop model plans that promote social justice and cohesion which will be 
posted on the Open Curriculum webpage where students from different backgrounds can 
H[FKDQJHDQGSURYLGHSHHUUHYLHZDQGIHHGEDFNIRUHDFKRWKHU¶VZRUNDOORZLQJIRUDSRWHQWLDO
breakdown of stereotypes and barriers. 
- Choosing Peace Together: Creating a more positive attitude toward reconciliation at the 
grassroots level through education and psychosocial services by working with victims 
associations throughout BiH, the project reaches people already self-identified as being 
traumatized by the war, who have not managed to find closure on their own with a special 
emphasis placed on BiH youth because the post-war generation often feels responsible for the 
suffering of its parents, and for this reason may be even more opposed to reconciliation efforts.  
This program included speak-outs and trainings and helped to establish the Network for Building 
Peace, a network of over 100 local and international organizations to support reconciliation. 
Percentage of Total Aid: 5% (~$7.29 million) 
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Economic Development: 
- Fostering Agricultural Markets Activity (F A R M A): Helping BiH expand its economy and 
prepare for accession to the EU through technical assistance and training that improves the 
competitiveness of BiH agricultural producers and businesses. 
- Fostering Interventions for Rapid Market Advancement (F IR M A):  Supporting sustainable 
economic growth, employment expansion, and increased household incomes in BiH by helping 
companies better compete in international markets by supporting joint exhibitions at top trade 
fairs and establishing producer sales agencies in the US and UK.  FIRMA has supported over 
500 companies. 
- Development C redit Authority Loan Portfolio Guarantee: Mobilizing private capital to 
finance development initiatives in BiH and demonstrating the economic viability of such 
investments to the local banking sector. 
- Enterprise Energy E fficiency (3E): Promoting and expanding the use of clean, safe, and 
affordable energy efficiency technology in BiH through 17+ pilot projects in buildings. 
- G rowth-O riented Local Development (G O L D): Assisting local communities in achieving 
their economic growth and development goals through local economic development planning, 
engaging stakeholders to improve public service delivery and business enabling reforms, 
promoting new direct investment, etc. 
- Partnership for Innovation: Supporting the creation and operation of Business Innovation 
Centers (BICs) in four BiH cities -- Banja Luka, Tuzla, Mostar, and Sarajevo ± as sustainable 
service providers that will continue strengthening local information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) capacity after the end of the project. 
- Solar Energy as the Future of Sustainable Development: Bringing together producers and 
users of solar energy collectors in BiH, this program provides 20 small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) with access to finance and technical assistance to develop sustainable 
production of solar collectors. 
- Student Entrepreneurship: Developing student entrepreneurship and civic participation in 
BiH by partnering with three BiH universities in Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka.  In each 
location, this project provides assistDQFHWKURXJKSUDFWLFDO³VFKRROVRIHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS´OHGE\
experts and entrepreneurs who share their knowledge with students wanting to start their own 
businesses through workshops and practical education modules. 
Percentage of Total Aid: 71% (~$111.23 million) 
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Human Rights: 
- ,W¶V$ERXW$ELOLW\: Campaigning to change public perception about children living with 
disabilities so that they are included in all aspects of society in BiH.  This includes a media 
campaign and public relations events. 
Percentage of Total Aid: .2% (~$340,000.00) 
Independent Media: 
- Strengthening Independent Media: Promoting complete, unbiased news coverage through 
traditional and alternative media. 
Percentage of Total Aid: 4% (~$5.7 million) 
 
USAID Results 
Overall, USAID has given over $1.6 billion in aid to BiH since 1996.  In terms of 
economic development, USAID reports a number of accomplishments during the 18 years it has 
worked in this country62.  These include providing 600 loans worth $162 million to help 
businesses restart operations and employ more than 16,000 citizens, connecting 600 companies 
in the wood and metal processing and tourism sectors to new international markets thus creating 
an estimated 2900 new jobs, and guaranteeing 247 loans worth $47.5 million dollars, helping to 
create or sustain an estimated 4400 jobs. 
USAID also reports having assisted more than 500 small farmer and agri-business groups 
with more than 18,000 beneficiaries across BiH to expand production, improve quality, and 
access new markets.  Because Bosnia and Herzegovina has no Ministry of Agriculture, USAID 
helped create and implement standards for Bosnian farmers to overcome some constraints for the 
export of food to the EU; Bosnian fish and honey now can be exported and milk and potatoes are 
                                                                                                                    
62  This  is  another  section  where  due  to  information  available,  the  following  information  is  unfortunately  worded  
rather  vaguely  and  may  be  biased  as  it  was  gathered  from  USAID.  
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expected to become eligible soon.  USAID also has provided almost $9 million in grants to 
microcredit organizations for loans for more than 5500 small farmers. 
In terms of creating a better business environment, USAID reports to have reduced the 
time to obtain a construction permit from 260 days to less than 60, though it does not specify 
exactly how.  It also reports to have introduced some tax reforms, likely by working with 
domestic politicians and civil society, increasing revenue collection by 15% and the number of 
registered taxpayers by 12%.  Finally, USAID helped BiH establish the state-level Deposit 
Insurance agency which has substantially increased deposits in commercial banks. 
In terms of increasing state capacity, USAID reports work done on judicial reform 
including updating court procedures so case only takes half the time to resolve, reducing the 
backlog of the Constitutional Court by 75%, and creating a Justice Network of 64 civil society 
and legal professional groups, partnering with government, and advocating for legal reforms.  
USAID also introduced the use of audio equipment to record hearings to increase transparency 
and accuracy. 
USAID also reports working on increasing government accountability.  This includes the 
previously mentioned Freedom of Information law, but also assistance with the passing of a law 
on registering non-governmental organizations and a whistleblower protection law, though again 
it does not specify exactly how.  USAID also has assisted over 100 organizations to better 
monitor government performance and advocate for policy changes, such as its work with its 
Anti-&RUUXSWLRQ&LYLF2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶8QLILHG1HWZRUNproject, as well as created the first 
:RPHQ¶V&DXFXVLQWKH%DONDQVWKURXJKLWVZRUNZLWKfemale politicians. 
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Less directly related to state consolidation, but still of indirect vital importance, USAID 
has worked on promoting tolerance between ethnic groups, as demonstrated by the above-
detailed projects including Trust-Understanding-Responsibility for the Future, Peace Education 
on location, and Education for a Just Society.  To that end it has created and integrated violence 
prevention curriculum into mainstream education, facilitated conflict resolution among youth in 
31 ethnically mixed communities through over 784 community development projects, and 
worked with 120 victim organizations to provide psycho-social support to survivors and organize 
100 speaking-out events. 
E ffectiveness of USAID 
Effectiveness in international aid is a difficult thing to quantify, but it is doable.  To that 
end I have picked a few variables including: efficiency, domestic involvement, accountability, 
transparency, and measurable results.  Not all of the other criteria can be answered fully either, 
but that will speak to the criteria of transparency.  These variables were chosen from The Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action63.  While there are other 
variables these were chosen as they were the best ones for the purposes of this paper.   
Efficiency is defined as getting the most results for the least amount of money.  In other 
words, it measures how the money is being spent and how much positive development is coming 
from these projects.  Domestic involvement measures how involved domestic actors are in the 
projects funded by these organizations.  When domestic actors are more invested in a project, it 
is made more legitimate and may be more successful.  Accountability measures how both donors 
and partner countries and actors are accountable for their results.  Transparency measures how 
                                                                                                                    
63  KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͘͞dŚĞWĂƌŝƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŝĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ĐĐƌĂŐĞŶĚĂĨŽƌĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm.  
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easily information on the organization and its projects are found as well as how much 
information is available.  Finally, measurable results look at the final results of these projects and 
what they have accomplished64. 
Efficiency is important in any organization in the world.  It is getting the most bang for 
RQH¶VEXFNZKLFKHVSHFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWZKHQLWFRPHVWRIRUHLJQDLG:KLle there is a lack of 
LQIRUPDWLRQRYHUDOORQ86$,'¶VHIILFLHQF\WKHUHLVRQHQRWDEOHFDVHRILQHIILFLHQF\:KLOH
USAID has its Anti-&RUUXSWLRQ&LYLF2UJDQL]DWLRQV¶8QLILHG1HWZRUNWKH(8KDVLWV/HJDO
Anti-Corruption Network (LACON).  This is a clear case of project overlap where, while 
LACON does some extra things like analyzing and proposing legislation, there is no need for 
there to be two separate anti-corruption networks when it would be better to have one merged 
network. 
Another important variable in the effectiveness of an aid organization is how involved are 
GRPHVWLFDFWRUVLQWKHDLGRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VSURJUDPV7KLVDOVRLQFOXGHVKRZPXFKRIWKH
programs are actually run by domestic actors.  There are of course issues with this as sometimes 
domestic actors are not as qualified, but it is important to have Bosnians involved because it 
increases legitimacy of those programs in the eyes of Bosnian citizens.  In a number of USAID 
projects there is clear Bosnian involvement in terms of cooperation with domestic actors 
including politicians, experts, and organizations.  But especially when it comes to training, most 
of them are opaque about who is doing the actual training.  It can be assumed that most of that 
training is being done by USAID employees, but without more information available there is no 
way to know. 
                                                                                                                    
64  KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͘͞dŚĞWĂƌŝƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŝĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ĐĐƌĂŐĞŶĚĂĨŽƌĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm.  
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Accountability is also important because this ensures that the aid organization maintains a 
high level standard for its programs.  Accountability is tied in with transparency because without 
transparency, accountability is not possible.  There must be a freedom of information for 
Bosnians to know what USAID is doing and be able to hold it accountable.  To that extent 
USAID does have a few websites for a few of its programs, but otherwise there is limited 
information available and not all of it is easily found.  Therefore USAID at this time is not very 
accountable for the average citizen.  It needs to improve its transparency in order to become a 
more effective aid organization. 
Finally, actual results are of course an important part of judging the effectiveness of an 
aid organization.  USAID has provided information about its general results and it is clear it has 
done a lot of good ranging from supporting legislation being passed to developing the banking 
sector to supporting civil society and small farmers.  That being said, in the larger scheme of 
things USAID has not been as effective in its larger goals: improved democracy and governance 
and economic growth.  While growth treQGVIRUJRYHUQPHQWKDYHEHHQVORZEXWSRVLWLYH%L+¶V
economic growth has not.  Unemployment is still incredibly high, government debt is growing, 
there are substantial barriers to business creation, and corruption is only making it harder for the 
economy to improve65.  Overall USAID is by no means performing poorly, at least from its 
reported results, it is not being as effective as it should. 
  
                                                                                                                    
65  European  Commission.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  2013  Progress  Report.  p.24-­‐6.  Accessed  April  5,  2014.  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ba_rapport_2013.pdf.  
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III. European Union 
 7KHPRGHUQ(XURSH$LGLVD³'LUHFWRUDWH-*HQHUDO´DFRPELQDWLRQRIVHYHUDOSUHYLRXV
European international aid organizations(XURSH$LGLVWKH(8¶V³RQH-VWRSVKRS´IRUSURYLGLQJ
international aid as well as making it easier for stakeholders and donators to have one point of 
contact.  EuropeAid was involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina since even before the war in the 
1990s with the European Commission Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO) which was founded in 
1992.  Today though, it has ceased programming with BiH since its role was taken over starting 
with the Community Assistance for Reconstruction and Democratic Stabilisation (CARDS) 
program in 2001 and followed by the Instrument for Pre-Accession, both of which are 
administered directly by the EU. 
 Overall EU financial support to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991-2013 was 3.2 billion 
Euros.  This amount was delivered through various programs and organizations: the European 
Commission Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO), the Emergency Assistance Programme (EAP), 
the Democracy and Human Rights program (which still actively funds development programs in 
BiH), the Phare Programme, the Obnova Programme, the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction and Democratic Stabilisation (CARDS), and most recently the Instrument for 
Pre-Accession (IPA). 
 On the heels of the Dayton Agreement, the EU started the Phare and Obnova 
Programmes which ran from 1996 to 2000.  During the 4 years the EU spent ¼PLOOLRQ in five 
main areas: post-war reconstruction, democratization and institution building, sustainable 
economic development, integrated activities to encourage refugee return, and civil society and 
social development. 
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 In my research I found information on the Phare Essential Aid Program from 1996-1998, 
but no specifics on the Obnova program, so only the Phare Program will be discussed in greater 
detail.  The Phare program ran from 1996-2000 and acted as a priority reconstruction and 
economic recovery program.  Its main purpose was to provide essential aid in the form of fast 
supplies of materials, equipment and spare parts to the ten vital economic sectors (Equipment to 
Federal Institutions, Health, Education, Housing, Agriculture, Energy, Water and Sanitation, 
Transport, Telecommunications, Investment and project preparation, and Management).  
According the EU review of this program, the EAP overall had a strong, but variable direct 
impact depending on the sector.  Most of the equipment and goods delivered met the needs of 
those who received them, but the report found that the impact of this aid could have been 
improved with better management, more staff, more technical expertise, and in particular more 
flexible implementation. 
 One thing of particular importance the report noted was that the Federation benefited 
from the largest part of the funding with only about 10% directed to Republika Srpska, when the 
intention was 30%.  This mostly had to do with frequent political suspension of the assistance by 
Republika Srpska.  Overall, the report found that in the Federation the supplies delivered to all 
Ministries had a positive impact on standardization and ease of communication, but in Republika 
Srpska the distribution of the equipment to regional technical institutes limited the impact on 
central institution-building.  Overall the EU spent ¼262.8 million on the Phare Program with 200 
million of that in the first two years, and ¼553 million on the Obnova Program where the money 
was more equally distributed over time. 
After the end of the Phare and Obnova Programs, the EU launched the 2001 Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans (CARDS) program.  
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Overall the EU spent ¼412.5 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 5 priority sectors that 
VXSSRUWHG%L+¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH6WDELOL]DWLRQDQG$VVRFLDWLRQ3URFHVV6$3GHPRFUDWLF
stabilization, administrative capacity building, economic and social development, environment 
and natural resources, and justice and home affairs.  Within the area of democratic stabilization, 
the EU focused on the return of refugees and displaced persons, including things like housing 
repair, monitoring and evaluating said housing repair, and financial support to the Civil 
Protection Authority, and the civil society and media.   
In terms of good governance and institution building the EU focused on judicial reform, 
police reform, asylum and migration, integrated border management, public administration 
reform, and customs and taxes.  In terms of economic and social development, the EU 
concentrated on the investment climate, trade, infrastructure, the environment, and education and 
employment.  Finally, the EU also focused on the opening of the community programs, though 
this was only a minor program started in 2004. 
In 2007 the EU implemented the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) program 
for all candidates of potential candidate countries, BiH included, for accession to the EU.  The 
IPA contains 5 components with three only for candidate countries.  Transition assistance and 
institution building and cross-border cooperation are for all nations a part of the IPA, and 
regional development, human resources development, and rural development programs are only 
for nations at candidate status.  From 2007-2013 the EU spent ¼655.5 million on BiH. 
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>2YHUYLHZRIEXGJHWDOORFDWLRQVLQ¼0SHUSURJUDPPHIRU%L+IRU,3$@
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 All
Transition Assistance 
and Institution Building 58.1 69.9 43.9 100.7 102.7 102.7 103.5 581.5
Cross-border 
Co-operation 4.0 4.9 5.2 4.7 4.7 5.2 5.3 34.0
T O T A L 62.1 74.8 89.1 105.4 107.4 107.9 108.8 655.5
 
The Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document for 2011-2013 focused on six sectors for 
WKH(8¶VIRFXVMXVWLFHDQGKRPHDIIDLUVSXEOLFDGPLQLVWUDWLRQUHIRUPSULYDWHVHFWRU
development, transportation, environment and climate change, and social development 
Projects Funded (IPA) 
 From 2007 to today under the IPA the EU has implemented 23 programs.  Of these 
projects there are 2 projects promoting environmentalism, 17 on economic development, 3 on 
capacity building and legitimacy, and 1 on human rights.  Excluding the regional projects 
(Adriatic CBC Programme, Mediterranean Programme, South East Europe Programme) which 
do not have numbers for how much BiH specifically got and a 20 million Euro loan for the Sava 
Waterway project, the total for the below listed projects is 28,217,100.09 Euros.  The combined 
value of the regional programs is 189,949,334 Euros.  Below are summaries of the projects the 
EU has implemented since 2007, grouped by relevant theme. 
Environmentalism: 
- Joint Action for G reen Industry: Building capacities of civil society organizations for 
monitoring the behavior of the industry in compliance with environmental permits. 
- Partnership for H igher Environmental Standards in BiH:  Increasing the capacity of NGOs 
and the level of public participation in environmental policy making as well as promoting good 
governance through the protection of environmental rights. 
Total Aid: 180,000 Euros  
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Capacity Building/Legitimacy: 
- Legal Anti-Corruption Network L A C O N BiH : Analyzing relevant laws, drafting 
amendments for laws that are not harmonized with UN Conventions Against Corruption, drafting 
missing laws which are required by UN convention, public awareness raising, and training for 
network members. 
- Support for E fficient Prison Management: Improving staff and management capacity in 
prisons, promote use of non-custodial sanctions & strengthen ability to remedy shortcomings and 
to provide suitable support for prisoners with special needs. 
- Support for the BiH Judiciary: Improving WKHZRUNRIWKHFRXUWVDQGSURVHFXWRUV¶RIILFHV
through the necessary Information and Communication Technology (ICT) equipment. 
Total Aid: 2.294 million Euros 
Human Rights 
- Support to the National Action Plans (N AP) on Roma Inclusion: Establishing an effective 
mechanism for implementation and monitoring of the National Action Plans in the fields of 
employment, housing and health, institutional strengthening, and capacity-building of both 
governments and non-governmental actors. 
Total Aid: 500,000 Euros 
Economic Development 
- Animal Disease Control and E radication Programme in BiH ± C lassical Swine Fever and 
Rabies: Reducing swine fever and rabies in pigs thus reducing public health ricks and 
economically benefiting the pig farming industry. 
- Capacity Strengthening of the BiH Rural Development Programming Capacities: Creating 
rural networks capable of engaging in the planning and implementation of local rural 
development programs utilizing participatory, community-based approaches. 
- IPA Adriatic C B C Programme: Strengthening sustainable development capabilities of the 
Adriatic region with three priorities: economic, social, and institutional cooperation; natural and 
cultural resources and risk prevention; and accessibility and networks. 
- Mediter ranean Programme (M E D),PSURYLQJWKHDUHD¶VFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVZLWKIRXU
priorities: strengthening innovation capacities, environmental protection and promotion of a 
sustainable territorial development, improvement of mobility and of territorial accessibility, and 
the promotion of a polycentric and integrated development of the Med space. 
- Preparation of IPA RD Sector Reviews in BiH : Preparing for sector studies based on EU 
standards to be done on the Meat and Dairy, Fruits and Vegetables (including wine sector), and 
DiversificatiRQDUHDVRI%L+¶VDJULFXOWXUDOVHFWRU 
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- Strengthening and Harmonisation of the BiH Agriculture and Rural Sectors Information 
System: Addressing immediate BiH needs for accurate and reliable agricultural data for the rural 
economy based on EU harmonized methods of data collection and analysis developed through 
the pilot projects performance. 
- Supplies for B H Mine Action Centre: Upgrading technical capacities to implement their core 
activities related to the supervision of Mine Action activities in BiH, by provision of protective 
equipment, clothes, shoes, notebooks and vehicles and training. 
- Supply of Equipment for Food Control Laboratories: Supporting enforcement of BiH food 
safety, compositional and quality legislation through provision of the equipment for food control 
laboratories. 
- Support for strengthening the capital base of the Deposit Insurance Agency of BiH : 
Strengthening capital from the EC in combination with the stand-by credit line from the EBRD 
will enable the DIA to raise the deposit insurance limit to KM 50,000 (EUR 25,565) while 
maintaining sound coverage. 
-  South East Europe Programme (SE E): Improving the territorial, economic and social 
integration process in South East Europe and contribute to cohesion, stability and 
competitiveness of the area through the development of transnational partnerships. 
-  Central Bosnia Region, Zavidovici, K akanj - T AJA N - Tourism, Adventure, Joy, 
A ttractions, Nature: Improving competitiveness of the Central Bosnia region in the niche of 
eco-tourism by development of sustainable tourism Designated Eco Zone TAJAN. 
- IPA C B C C roatia ± Bosnia and Herzegovina: Creating a Joint Economic Space to contribute 
to the integration of the economy in border areas and to encourage creation of cross-border 
networks and partnerships and the development of joint cross-border actions. 
- âLSRYR(FR=RQH: Establishing sustainable eco-tourism LQWKHâLSRYRUHJLRQWKURXJKthe 
creation of an eco zone with support to infrastructure, tourism program development, extensive 
training and education campaigns, and coordinated marketing efforts. 
- Support to Development of the Eco Tourism in Sutjeska National: Developing eco-tourism 
in Sutjeska National Park through the development of new eco-tourist products, the development 
of tourist infrastructure, the strengthening the human capacities, and new marketing approaches. 
- Sava Waterway Rehabilitation Project: Providing the preconditions (demining and provision 
of main design) for the re-establishment of the Sava River inland navigation route. 
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- Responsible Management of Medical Waste: Adopting and implementing laws and 
regulations at the national and entity levels of Bosnia and Herzegovina related to the responsible 
Medical Waste (MW) management, contributing to the eventual admission of BiH into the EU. 
- C B C Bosnia and Herzegovina ± Montenegro: Foster the joint sustainable development of the 
cross-border area by strengthening the capacities of human resources and joint institutional 
networks among local communities and local private and public actors 
Total Aid (Excluding Regional Projects): 25.241 million Euros 
 
E ffectiveness in State Consolidation 
In order to MXGJHWKH(8'HOHJDWLRQ¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVWKHVDPHVWDQGDUGV taken from the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness will be used: efficiency, domestic involvement, 
accountability, transparency, and measurable results66.   
In terms of efficiency, overall the (8¶V bureaucratic system is complex to the point of 
cumbersome to the casual observer.  The multiple organizations and programs that have been 
used in BiH throughout the years add another level of complexity to an already extremely 
complex situation.  As tKH(8¶VLQIRUPDWLRQRQLWVSURMHFWVZDVHYHQOHVVWKDQ86$,'¶V
unfortunately there is not much to judge, but with the multiple organizations and projects 
involved, in the past and in the present, there is a case to be made that it would be more efficient 
to have just one organization involved in Bosnian affairs. 
The first measure, domestic involvement, is difficult to measure as the information 
gathered really does not say either way.  It can be assumed that there is some proportion of EU 
and domestic actors involved in EU programming, but without evidence this is only speculation.  
As for accountability, the lack of transparency like with USAID is detrimental to this.  There are 
                                                                                                                    
66  KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͘͞dŚĞWĂƌŝƐĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŝĚĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ĐĐƌĂŐĞŶĚĂĨŽƌĐƚŝŽŶ͘͟http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm.  
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at least some reports for USAID and the EU, but these are not by any means easily found for the 
DYHUDJHFLWL]HQ1HLWKHURUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VZHEVLWHKDVUHSRUWVHDVLO\IRXQGRQWKHLUZHEVLWHZKLFK
further demonstrates the lack of transparency, and therefore the lack of accountability.   An 
additional difficulty with transparency is that information is listed for EU regional projects, but it 
does not explain what how Bosnia and Herzegovina specifically is affected by it, nor how much 
money it actually has received out of the total. 
In terms of results the EU with its overall lack of detailed information, unsurprisingly 
also has little available about the results of its projects.  There is some broad information 
available from other sources, detailing the results of its conditionality policies and the OHR, 
which is the most transparent of all of these organizations, having detailed information about all 
of its decisions since it was created available and easily found on its website.  But, this broad 
information does not come from the EU itself which is another testament to its issues with 
transparency.  Overall the EU needs to work on its accountability, efficiency, and transparency. 
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Incentives for Reform: The Matter of Conditionality 
OnHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRURI%L+¶VVWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQ is that this country wants to eventually 
join the European Union.  While this is idea is one of the few ideas that is popular across ethnic 
lines, due to the slowness of the government to pass reforms, BiH has yet to even accomplish 
becoming a candidate for accession to the EU.  However, this process of using soft power and 
positive incentives to guide Bosnian politicians to pass reforms in order to comply with EU 
standards is a powerful tool for state consolidation and political development that has clearly had 
some success. 
In order to accede to the EU a nation must meet three criteria.  In terms of politics, it 
must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect 
for and protection of minorities.  In terms of economics, it must have a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.  
As the EU originated as an economic union this part is very important so a country must be up to 
a certain economic standard in order to both be a valuable asset to the EU trade zone as well as 
be able to compete against larger more established companies in the economic zone.  Finally, a 
FRXQWU\PXVWEHDEOHWRDFFHSWWKH³&RPPXQLW\DFTXLV´RUWKHREOLJDWLRQVRIPHPEHUship 
including adherence to the aims of the political, economic, and monetary union of the EU67.  In 
other words, a country must accept the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions 
that make up the body of the European Union law. 
Currently BL+KDVEHHQUHFRJQL]HGDVD³SRWHQWLDOFDQGLGDWHFRXQWU\´7RIDFLOLWDWH
progress towards becoming a candidate in 2003 BiH started the process towards signing onto the 
                                                                                                                    
67  ƵƌŽƉĂ͘͞ĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ;ŽƉĞŶŚĂŐĞŶƌŝƚĞƌŝĂͿ͘͟ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂƌĐŚϵ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm  
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Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)68.  The SAA is an agreement that all potential 
candidate and candidate-status nations signed on to as a newly developed process for accession 
to the EU.  The main elements of the SAA include: promoting the free movement of goods; 
creating efficient institutions; developing a market economy; reducing crime and corruption; 
promoting higher education reform; developing democracy, human rights, and an independent 
PHGLDDQGLPSURYLQJWKHUHJLRQ¶VWUDQVSRUWLQIUDVWUXFWXUH 
Negotiations on a SAA started in 2005 and were expected to be finalized in late 2007, but 
negotiations were stalled due to disagreement over police reform.  Once the issue of police 
reform was completed though, the SAA was signed by BiH in 2008 and today all member states 
of the EU (besides Croatia which only last year joined the EU and thus is exempt) have ratified 
the agreement.  However, because BiH missed the deadline for one of the key required reforms, 
namely constitutional reform to protect minority rights, the EU has temporarily refused to fully 
ratify the agreement. 
In order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a candidate for accession to the EU it 
must first make some progress towards achieving the aforementioned criteria.  However, due to 
WKHVORZQHVVRI%L+¶VJRYHUQPHQWLQSDVVLQJUHIRUPVSURJUHVVRQWKDWIURQWKDVEHHn slow.  It 
has been slow enough to the point that the Office of the High Representative has remained open 
and will remain open until BiH meets the conditions for it to be closed.  As long as the OHR is 
open, BiH cannot submit a credible application to become a candidate for accession to the EU.  
7KHFRQGLWLRQVIRUFORVLQJWKH2+5DUHNQRZQDVWKH³$JHQGD´$VWKHQDPHVXJJHVWV
there are 5 main conditions for closure, with an additional two added later on.   
                                                                                                                    
68  The  Stabilization  and  Association  Agreement  (SAA)  is  what  the  nation  signs  while  the  Stabilization  and  
Association  Process  (SAP)  is  the  process  of  fulfilling  said  agreement.  
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These main conditions are: the acceptable and sustainable resolution of the issue of 
apportionment of property between state and other levels of government; the acceptable and 
VXVWDLQDEOHUHVROXWLRQRIGHIHQVHSURSHUW\WKHFRPSOHWLRQRIWKH%UþNR)LQDO$ZDUGILVFDO
responsibility (promoted through an agreement on a permanent ITA co-efficient methodology 
and establishment of a National Fiscal Council); and the entrenchment of the rule of law 
(demonstrated through the Adoption of National War Crimes Strategy, the passage of the Law on 
Aliens and Asylum, and the adoption of the National Justice Sector Reform Strategy).  The 
added two conditions are: the signing of the SAA, and a positive assessment of the situation in 
BiH by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board (PIC SB), another international body 
charged with ensuring full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement69. 
While there has been progress in completing the 5+2 Agenda, particularly the original 5, 
this progress has not been enough for the PIC SB to close the Office of the High Representative.  
That being said, it is good to look now at the some of the reforms the federal government has 
passed towards meeting EU standards for acceding to the EU.  In order for the EU to ratify the 
SAA, there have been three main demands: the creation of one governmental body to deal with 
foreign aid, the creation and implementation of the first census in over 20 years, and 
constitutional reform so that minorities can run for the Presidency and the House of Peoples.  In 
2012 BiH adopted the State Aid law in order to regulate the assigning, implementing, and the 
return of misused budget money in the country.  This was planned to establish and assure market 
FRQGLWLRQVDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VREOLJDWLRQVXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDODJUHHPHQWV,WDOVo created a single 
                                                                                                                    
69  KĨĨŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ŝŐŚZĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ͘͞dŚĞϱнϮŐĞŶĚĂ͘͟:ĂŶƵĂƌǇϭ͕ϮϬϭϮ͘ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇϭϱ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-­‐info/gen-­‐info/default.asp?content_id=46773.  
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unified body for international aid to the Bosnian state70. The other law passed to move the 
country closer to EU application status was the Census Law which provided for the coordination 
of the first census to take place in BiH since 199171.  This census took place in 2013, but is still 
being processed with the final results coming out in bits and pieces, estimated to take up to two 
years to be fully completed. 
The third main demand of the EU is the enactment of constitutional changes based on the 
Sejdic and F inci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina court case.  As previously discussed this court case 
involved a Jewish and Roma man suing Bosnia and Herzegovina for not having equal political 
rights.  With the way the political system is set up now, only Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats can be 
elected to the presidency and the House of Peoples.  In 2009 Sejdic and Finci argued this was a 
violation of their political rights and the European Court of Human Rights agreed, ruling that the 
Bosnian constitution must be changed so that minorities can have the same rights as the main 
three ethnic groups72.  The EU thus will not accept an application for accession until there is this 
constitutional reform.   
This has proved a greater challenge than initially anticipated largely because of how 
entrenched ethnic politics is in the constitution and in the political system.  For the issue of the 
presidency, having three presidents ensures that each main ethnic group has representation.  One 
solution would be to have only one president who is elected by the entire nation and is open to 
all, but the bottom line is that ethnic-based parties are reluctant to make changes because their 
                                                                                                                    
70  :ƵŬŝĐ͕ůǀŝƌĂ͘͞^ƚĂƚĞŝĚ>ĂǁWĂƐƐĞĚŝŶŽƐŶŝĂŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ͘͟Balkan  Insight,  February  3,  2012.  Accessed  March  6,  
2014.  http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-­‐state-­‐aid-­‐law-­‐passed-­‐bosnia-­‐parliament  
71  Sito-­‐^ƵĐŝĐ͕ĂƌŝĂ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂWĂƐƐĞƐ>ĂǁƐ<ĞǇƚŽhďŝĚ͕DƵƐůŝŵƐŐƌĞĞƚŽĞŶƐƵƐ͘͟Reuters,  February  3,  2012.  
Accessed  March  6,  2014.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/us-­‐bosnia-­‐laws-­‐eu-­‐
idUSTRE81221T20120203  
72  ͞^ĞĐŽŶĚůĂƐƐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ͗Discrimination  against  Roma,  Jews,  and  Other  National  Minorities  in  Bosnia  and  
,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͘͟Human  Rights  Watch,  2012.  p.2-­‐3.  Accessed  March  1,  2014.  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bosnia0412ForUpload_0_0.pdf  
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base of support largely comes from their ethnic group, and not as much on political or economic 
issues.  There still remains this fear among some Bosnians that if, for example, a Bosniak 
president were elected, he or she would abuse their power and would centralize the government 
and oppress the Croats and Serbs rights.  How many people believe this is inherently uncertain, 
but the prevalence of ethnic-based parties shows that there is still clearly distrust between the 
different ethnic groups. 
6WLOOSDVVLQJDFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPLVYLWDOQRWRQO\IRU%L+¶VFRQWLQXHGSDWKWRZDUGV
accession to the EU, but also the legitimacy of the Presidency and the House of Peoples which 
are to be elected later this year.  3DVVLQJWKLVUHIRUPZRXOGVKRZWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WR
compromise which would give the government more legitimacy not only in the eyes of the Roma 
and Jews, but many other Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as well.  But, bHFDXVHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
failure to find and pass a solution for this problem before the deadline in 2013, the EU suspended 
50% of IPA funds until further notice.  For a country that is already experiencing high 
unemployment and economic hardship, this is a serious blow, worth 47 million Euros.  It is of 
critical importance that a compromise be made and a solution found, but as not even the threat of 
losing half of its aid from the EU was enough to push through a compromise after 4 long years, it 
is difficult to see a solution coming in the near future.  Yet, perhaps with the new elections in 
2014 the Bosnian people will be able to voice their dissatisfaction with the government and vote 
LQSROLWLFLDQVPRUHZLOOLQJWRFRPSURPLVHWKLVVHHPV%L+¶VEHVWEHWWRZDUGVEHLQJDEOHWR
progress in the future. 
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Police Reform 
Besides these three main demands, the EU has worked with BiH directly with its 
delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CARDS, IPA, SAA, and the Office of the High 
Representative.  Using these various bodies and projects, the European Union has cooperated 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina on a variety of reform-based projects.  One major project was the 
area of policHUHIRUPLQRUGHUWRWDFNOHWKHEORDWHGDQGRYHUO\FRPSOH[V\VWHPRI%L+¶VYDULRXV
police bodies. The police force was one of the most sensitive areas of Bosnian public 
administration after the war because during the war many police participated in the ethnic 
cleansing and violence.   In BiH there were 10 cantonal police forces, one %UþNRSROLFHIRUFH
one Federation and one Republika Srpska police force, the SBS, the State Information and 
Protection Agency, judicial police, and financial police for a total of around 17,000 staff and a 
cost of about 180 million euros per year73.  The state of the police in BiH represents the problems 
of the larger nation: overly expensive and complex. 
The international community has also been involved LQ%L+¶VSROLFHIRUFHHVSHFLDOO\
after the war as members of the police force had been a part of the fighting.  Initially the 
International Police Task Force, a component of the UN, was the only international oversight 
over the Bosnian police force.74  However, by 2005 WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VLQIOXHQFHRYHU
WKH6HUE5HSXEOLF¶VSROLFHKDGHURGHG, leading the European Commission to endorse 
recommendations put forth by the OHR, establishing a Police Restructuring Commission in 
RUGHUWRUHIRUP%L+¶Vpolice services to ensure fairness   
                                                                                                                    
73  Aybet,  Gülnur,  and  Florian  Bieber.  "From  Dayton  to  Brussels:  The  Impact  of  EU  and  NATO  Conditionality  on  State  
Building  in  Bosnia  &  Hercegovina."  Europe-­‐Asia  Studies  63,  no.  10  (December  2011):  1917.  Political  Science  
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74  Bieber,  Florian,  Post-­‐War  Bosnia:  Ethnicity,  Inequality  and  Public  Sector  Governance.  New  York:  Palgrave  
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There were three requirements as a part of the recommendations: that all budgetary and 
legislative policy making on police matters should be transferred to state-level institutions, that 
police districts should be drawn on technical, not political grounds, which would allow police 
units to cross into the other entity when necessary, and that policing should be free from political 
influence.  Unlike many other issues that had come in front of the federal legislature, because of 
its importance as a vital step towards becoming a candidate for accession to the EU, the 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVKDGDUHDOVKRWDWEHFRPLQJODZ,QDGGLWLRQ0LURM/DMþiNKDGMXVWEHFRPH
the new High Representative and was strongly backing the cause75. 
However, in 2006 the newly elected Serb Prime Minister Milorad Dodik blocked the 
DWWHPSWWRWXUQWKHVHSDUDWHHQWLWLHV¶SROLFHIRUFHVLQWRRQHLQWHU-HQWLW\SROLFHIRUFH/DMþiN
UHDFWHGE\XVLQJWKH+LJK5HSUHVHQWDWLYH¶VRYHUULGLQJSRZHUVWRFKDQJHWKHYRWLQJSURcedures to 
make it more difficult for the entities to block national level decision-making through blockages 
by absenteeism.  Serb politicians viewed this as an attack on WKH6HUE5HSXEOLF¶VDXWRQRP\ and 
Dodik temporarily withdrew all Serb ministers from the Council of Ministers and threatened to 
step down from office, standing firm on their position for the next six weeks76.  Ultimately, 
/DMþDNZDVIRUFHGWRDFFHSWDZHDNHUFRPSURPLVHLQZKLFKWKHFODXVHVDERXWFUHDWLQJDQLQWHU-
entity police force were removed.  Soon afterwards in 2008 the EU, fearing a complete loss of 
LQIOXHQFHVLJQHGDVWDELOL]DWLRQDQGDVVRFLDWLRQWUHDW\GHVSLWH%RVQLD¶VIDLOXUHWRPHHWLWVLQLWLDO
demands77.   This incident is just one example of how the separate entities created by the Dayton 
                                                                                                                    
75  ĞůůŽŶŝ͕ZŽďĞƌƚŽ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͗ĂǇƚŽŶŝƐĞĂĚ͊>ŽŶŐ>ŝǀĞĂǇƚŽŶ͊͟/ŶPathways  from  Ethnic  Conflict:  Institutional  
Redesign  in  Divided  Societies,  by  John  Coakley,  104-­‐105.  New  York:  Routledge,  2010.  
76  DĐDĂŚŽŶ͕WĂƚƌŝĐĞ͕͘ĂŶĚ:ŽŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶ͘͞dŚĞĞĂƚŚŽĨĂǇƚŽŶ͗,ŽǁƚŽ^ƚŽƉŽƐŶŝĂĨƌŽŵ&ĂůůŝŶŐƉĂƌƚ͘͟Foreign  
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77  BellŽŶŝ͕ZŽďĞƌƚŽ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂ͗ĂǇƚŽŶŝƐĞĂĚ͊>ŽŶŐ>ŝǀĞĂǇƚŽŶ͊͟/ŶPathways  from  Ethnic  Conflict:  Institutional  
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Agreement have become tied to separatist nationalist interests and how they have prevented 
reform to create more effective functioning governmental structures. 
For obvious reasons, this police reform has bHHQWKHPRVWFRQWURYHUVLDORIWKH(8¶s 
projects in BiH.  What makes this case different than judicial reform or other conditions is that 
the OHR was still heavily involved in this process, putting a lot of pressure on Bosnian 
politicians to pass the reforms and even using its powers to change the voting laws to make it 
more likely to pass.  Plus, tKH(8¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQKDYLQJQHZSROLFLQJUHJLRQVWKDWZRXOGFXW
across entities and having the budgetary and legislative aspects of the police force rest with the 
state represented a line in federal state consolidation that Republika Srpska politicians refused to 
cross.  More than that, even Bosniak and Croat politicians were dissatisfied with the proposed 
solutions.  In addition, police reforms became linked to the Stabilization and Association Process 
which tied it now to conditionality to the EU, which is something that had not been previously 
part of the agreement.  In the end, the police reform package that passes achieved few, if any of 
the original goals of the EU and the OHR.  In addition the package established a largely 
symbolic policing superstructure at the state level, which would only assume real powers after 
the completion of constitutional reforms.  By linking this police reform to constitutional reforms, 
this not only ended all efforts to engage in state building via police reform, it also now added a 
disincentive for Republika Srpska to engage in constitutional reforms78. 
In 2006 the international community made its first major effort to push for constitutional 
reform in an effort to further centralize decision-making and state institutions.  This led to a 
WHQWDWLYHDJUHHPHQWWKDWLQFOXGHGVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶V&RXQFLORI0LQLVWHUV
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and creating two new national ministries, including one for a unified agricultural policy and one 
for science, technology, and the environment.  The proposal of creating a Ministry of Agriculture 
was particularly important because it is one of the mandatory ministries for any country to enter 
EU and it would open BiH up to being able to export more of its agricultural products to 
countries in the EU.  The proposal broke down when at the last minute the then Bosniak 
President Silajdzic and the leaders of a breakaway faction of the Croatian Democratic Union 
opposed the package.  In the end, the proposed amendment failed by just two votes shy of the 
necessary 2/3 majority in the parliament.79   
While BiH has yet to create a Ministry of Agriculture, in 2008 the state-level Law on 
Agriculture, Food, and Rural Development (AFRD) was adopted.  It has provided for 
clarification of competencies at all administrative levels, creation of a strategic framework for 
the harmonized agri-food and rural development policy, and the development of new structures 
that be required for this country to eventually join the EU.  More recently though in 2013 the EU 
suspended 5 million euros of earmarked money for agriculture and rural development projects as 
BiH authorities failed to complete preparations for two agriculture and rural development 
projects. 
Corruption 
Another area that the EU has sought to address overall is corruption, which remains a 
major problem for BRVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW$WHYHU\OHYHOWKHUHKDYH
been corruption scandals.  A large factor in the growth of corruption in the administration has 
been the system set up by Dayton.  With almost every public office, even including low-level 
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administration jobs, allotted according to an ethnic quota, a spoils system has grown that has led 
to extensive patronage networks, corruption, and inefficiencies.  BiH has 160 government 
ministers and a public sector that eats up about half of the VWDWH¶VDQQXDOEXGJHW In addition, 
corruption is a huge problem in the government, both in the local and the federal levels.  In 1999 
it was found that over $1 billion in aid, nearly 1/5 the total amount that had been given from 
1996-1999, had disappeared80.   
This corruption in the political domain is particularly corrosive as it undermines the 
GHPRFUDWLFSURFHVVZKLOHDOVRXQGHUPLQLQJSHRSOH¶VWUXVWLQWKHJRYHUQPHQWZKLFKZDVQRWYHU\
high in the first place.  The recent protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina that started in February 
2014 started in part to protest the corruption found in the government at all levels.  Part of the 
corruption in the government stems from the bloated bureaucracy, which accounted for about 
54% of the annual GDP in 2005, higher than any other European nation.  The different and 
overlapping layers of government create a confusing uneven set of rules that is difficult to 
navigate, opaque, and not very accountable.  In particular, political parties are one of the biggest 
sources of corruption as many positions in the government are filled along political allegiances 
rather than by merit81.  One program the EU has enacted as a part of IPA was the Legal Anti-
Corruption Network (LACON) from 2011-2013 which looked to amend laws not harmonized 
with the UN Conventions against corruption and to draft new laws required by the UN 
convention. 
                                                                                                                    
80  DĐDĂŚŽŶ͕WĂƚƌŝĐĞ͕͘ĂŶĚ:ŽŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶ͘͞dŚĞĞĂƚŚŽĨĂǇƚŽŶ͗,ŽǁƚŽ^ƚŽƉŽƐŶŝĂĨƌŽŵ&ĂůůŝŶŐƉĂƌƚ͘͟Foreign  
Affairs  88,  no.  5  (September/October  2009):  75.    JSTOR  (accessed  25,  2013).  
81  Chêne,  Marie.  Corruption  and  Anti-­‐Corruption  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  Anti-­‐Corruption  Resource  Centre,  
2009.  http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-­‐and-­‐anti-­‐corruption-­‐in-­‐bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina-­‐bih/.  
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The judiciary system, DQRWKHUDVSHFWRI%L+¶VJRYHUQPHQWthat is considered to be corrupt, 
LVDQRWKHUDUHDRI%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VJRYHUQPHQWthat the EU has been cooperating 
through various projects.  7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶VSROORI%RVQLDQFLWL]HQVUHYHDOHGWKDW
public opinion generally considers the judiciary system to be corrupt, rating it 3.5/5 with 5 being 
extremely corrupt and 0 being not corrupt at all.  The Bertelsmann Transformation Report from 
2008 reports that the judiciary system has a legacy of being influenced by political parties, ethnic 
bias, weak professional standards, and corruption.  Independent judges have even been 
intimidated and threatened.  All this being said, according to the 2008 World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators the trends in regards to corruption have been positive, though corruption 
still remains a major problem82.   
,Q%RVQLD¶V$QWL-Corruption $JHQF\¶VPDQDJHPHQWZDVILQDOO\DSSRLQWHGWZR
years after the founding of the agency.  Yet, as of January 2013 the agency has not yet started 
FDUU\LQJRXWWKHDFWLYLWLHVRI%L+¶V$QWL-Corruption Strategy.  In addition the independence of 
the Anti-Corruption Agency has been questioned by groups like Transparency International (TI), 
an NGO that globally seeks to improve transparency in the governance of nations and rates 
OHYHOVRIFRUUXSWLRQDQGSHUFHLYHGFRUUXSWLRQE\DQDWLRQ¶VRZQFLWL]HQV7,KDVIRXQG evidence 
that the current institutions responsible for implementing anti-corruption laws suffer pressures 
from the executive branch.  Other institutions for implementing anti-corruption legislation are 
either under the full control of the government or do not have the capacity or authority to 
efficiently implement the laws83.   
                                                                                                                    
82  Chêne,  Marie.  Corruption  and  Anti-­‐Corruption  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  Anti-­‐Corruption  Resource  Centre,  
2009.  http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-­‐and-­‐anti-­‐corruption-­‐in-­‐bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina-­‐bih/.  
83  dƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů͘͞ŝ,KǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ͘͟ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂƌĐŚϳ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
http://www.transparency.org/country#BIH_Overview  
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Despite recognition from the Constitutional Court of BiH, the State Court and the 
3URVHFXWRU¶V2IILFHRI%L+LVVWLOObeing questioned by some political parties with some 
politicians even calling for the abolition of these bodies.  Furthermore, TI adds that audit offices 
have pointed out numerous irregularities in public expenditures and public contracting which 
have never been prosecuted by the judiciary.  Plus, statistics from a European Commission 
Progress Report on BiH indicate that very few cases of corruption result in criminal convictions.  
Even fewer reach final verdicts with 70% of corruption investigations ending up being dismissed.  
In 2010, only two final verdicts for cases of corruption resulted in jail sentences84. 
The core of the problem of the judicial system of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in its 
fractured system.  This country with an estimated population of 3.8 million people, about the size 
of a typical larger Western European city, has four different criminal justice systems, one for the 
VWDWHWZRIRUWKHHQWLWLHVDQGRQHIRUWKH%UþNR'LVWULFW(DFKDSSOLHVGLIIHUHQWVXEVWDQWLYHDQG
procedural laws which results in equality of the law for BiH citizens not being assured.  Equality 
is dependent on the willingness at various levels to harmonize differing criminal laws which does 
not always happen.  BiH still lacks a judicial authority that could ensure uniform interpretation of 
different criminal laws applied by courts85. 
Corruption remains a big obstacle for Bosnia and Herzegovina¶VVWDWHFRQVROLGDWLRQ,W
UHGXFHVWKHVWDWH¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOFDSDFLW\E\ORZHULQJHIILFLHQF\LWUHGXFHVWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKH
government as people view the government as corrupt and not responsive to their needs, and it 
hinders economic growth.  To that end the EU has mandated judicial reform as part of the 
                                                                                                                    
84  dƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů͘͞ŝ,KǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ͘͟ĐĐĞƐƐĞĚDĂƌĐŚϳ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
http://www.transparency.org/country#BIH_Overview  
85  ZŽďďŝŶƐ͕'ĂƌǇ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͛ƐhŶĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞĨŽƌŵ͘͟New  Europe  April  25,  2010.  Accessed  
March  11,  2014.  http://www.neurope.eu/article/bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina%E2%80%99s-­‐unfinished-­‐judicial-­‐reform.  
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SURFHVVIRU%L+¶VDFFHVVLRQWRWKH(8$VWURQJDQGLQGHSHQGHQWMXGLFLDU\LVYLWDOIRUXSKROGLQJ
the rule of law.  An article in New Europe spells it out, saying: 
³$FOHDUDQGXQDPELJXRXVFRXQWU\-wide position recognizing the constitutional status of [the State Court and 
WKH3URVHFXWRU¶V2IILFHRI%L+@ZRXOGSURYLGHPXFK-needed stability and predictability to legal processes, 
lessen the risk of interference from executive and legislative branches of government, strengthen the 
principle of separation of powers, and foster the sustainability of re-IRUPVDOUHDG\XQGHUWDNHQ´86 
It is clear that judicial reform is an important step that needs to be WDNHQIRU%L+¶VVWDWH
consolidation.  The EU thus has been taking steps towards encouraging judicial reform from both 
within the framework of the IPA and with its Bosnian delegation. 
Under the IPA, the EU funded Support for the BiH Judiciary, a project started in 2010 
that ran until 2013 with a budget of 1.4 million euros.  This project worked to improve the work 
RIWKHFRXUWVDQGSURVHFXWRUV¶RIILFHVWKURXJKJLYLQJWKHPEHWWHUWHFKQRORJLFDOHTXLSPHQWLQ
order to improve efficiency, quality of information, and quickening exchanges of information 
between legal parties.  EU has also more directly worked with Bosnian officials to reform the 
MXGLFLDU\ZLWKWDONVDQGGLVFXVVLRQQDPHGLQ(8ZULWLQJVDVD³6WUXFWXUHG'LDORJXHRQ-XVWLFH´ 
Analysis 
When judging conditionality, one can see that there have been successes from this tactic.  
Conditionality has led to some reform of the police and it has also led to the creation of several 
important governmental bodies.  The EUs strategy of conditionality was improved with the 
creation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement which acts as a tangible milestone for 
countries that comes with real benefits.  BiH is close to the signing of this agreement, but even 
                                                                                                                    
86  RobbinƐ͕'ĂƌǇ͘͞ŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͛ƐhŶĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞĨŽƌŵ͘͟New  Europe  April  25,  2010.  Accessed  
March  11,  2014.  http://www.neurope.eu/article/bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina%E2%80%99s-­‐unfinished-­‐judicial-­‐reform.  
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then thDWKDVQ¶WEHHQHQRXJKSUHVVXUHWRXUJHSROLWLFLDQVWRSDVVWKHQHHGHGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUP
on minority rights.   
One big criticism of conditionality in general is how it does not always enact effective 
change even when reforms are passed.  Because conditionality uses pressure and coercion on an 
organization or country in order to meet a condition or set of conditions, this can create a conflict 
in legitimacy.  The political elites do not necessarily believe in the reforms that are passed and it 
is therefore not certain that the reforms will be properly enforced.  In addition these reforms 
might not be recognized by many Bosnian citizens as well.  On the other hand, particularly in the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is known for its political gridlock, conditionality is a 
useful tool for effecting change.  The case of police reform was problematic because it did not 
involve a consensus on the part of the Bosnian politicians, though there was very real historical 
basis for it, and in the end there was not a cultural shift among the police because there was no 
desire for it.  On the other hand, in other cases like with the State Aid Law these reforms were 
passed through the legislation without any drastic measures being taken.  As the OHR has 
dramatically VWHSSHGEDFNVLQFHWKH(8¶VPHWKRGRIFRQGLWLRQDOLW\KDVEHFRPHOHVV
problematic, though still with the problems inherent to conditionality.   
Still, the big problem is that the EU is pushing for conditions that further centralize a 
state in which a decent percentage of the population is firmly against further centralization and/or 
loss of entrenched ethnic reservations and quotas.  There still remains distrust between Bosnians 
and among a majority of Bosnian Serbs a disdain for the state.  In order for conditionality to 
work there needs to be an agreement among the political elites that currently does not exist. 
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Conditionality on making constitutional reforms is also always going to be more difficult 
in BiH because it means changing the political system itself.  Currently the system has a careful 
balance for the three main ethnic groups.  Changing the presidential system and parliamentary 
systems is a big change for any country, but especially one that is still embroiled in ethnic 
politics.  Politicians who base their power out of ethnic-based political parties in particular are 
going to be more likely to be against reducing ethnic reservations.  There is also the matter of 
many Bosnian Serb politicians who are firmly against further centralization of the country 
because they want, if anything, more autonomy for Republika Srpska.  This presents a conflict of 
interest not only for Bosnian Serbs, but ethnic-based politicians in general.  There has not been 
enough impetus for politicians to move past these barriers and pass the necessary reforms for 
FRQWLQXLQJ%L+¶VSDWKWRDFFHVVLRQ 
There is also the issue of mission creep with increased necessary conditions in order to 
sign the SAA.  The most notable example of this is the case of minority rights which resulted 
from the Sejdic and F inci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina FRXUWFDVHLQ3ULRUWRWKLVFDVH¶V
ruling there had been no demand to amend the constitution in this way.  This new addition makes 
it more difficult for the requirements to be met for the SAA to be signed.  Mission creep has also 
affected the OHR which still has yet to be closed because of added conditions for closure even 
WKRXJKWRGD\LWVHUYHVQRUHDOSXUSRVH7KLVODFNRIFRQVLVWHQF\FDQGHOHJLWLPL]HWKH(8¶V
efforts within the country this can be discouraging to Bosnian politicians.  Conditionality, for 
better and for worse, is a valuable tool, but as with any tool, there are limits as to what it can and 
cannot do.  From these results conditionality appears to have hit its limit in BiH and so the EU 
should look into using other tools like supporting civil society. 
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Chapter 3: Bringing it A ll Together 
In terms of the projects USAID and the EU have done so far in BiH, there is plenty of 
overlap in theme.  Both have worked on economic development on the local and rural levels, 
combatting corruption, strengthening government institutions, judicial reform, minority rights, 
ecotourism and constitutional reform.  More specifically though, USAID has focused on some 
things the EU has not like independent media, promoting civil society, increasing engagement of 
youth and women, promoting issue diversity in politics, and reconciliation, at least in more 
recent years.  On the other hand, the EU has focused on things USAID has not like 
environmentalism and more specific projects like prison management, pig disease control, and 
food control lab supplies. 
Because the EU works so extensively in BiH and uses its delegation and conditionality to 
deal with more broad issues, its projects since 2006 have GHDOWZLWKPRUH³VPDOOHU´LVVXHVPRUH
WKDQ86$,'¶VSURMHFWVKDYH2QHLVVXHWKDWKDVQRWEHHQWDFNOHGPRUHUHFHQWO\E\WKH(8KDV
been reconciliation.  With the shift from peace-building to state-building in the early 2000s, the 
EU has not had any reconciliation projects as part of the IPA while USAID lists 4 of them in the 
past few years.  On the other hand, the EU promotes environmentalism and ecotourism more 
than USAID does, which focuses more on regular economic development.  Together, the EU and 
USAID complement one another, covering a wide range of aspects of state consolidation. 
This being said, there should be more focus on not just economic development, but also 
reforming the federal government and employing more peace-building activities.  The heart of 
the problems in BiH remains the pre-occupation of Bosnian society with ethnic politics.  Even if 
inter-ethnic tensions remain stable, inter-personal trust between the ethnic groups remains 
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extremely low. The UNDP found, for example, that in 2009 less than 7% of non-Serb 
respondents in Serb-majority areas of Bosnia reported that they are trustful of others. 
USAID from 2009 to present has dedicated over $111 million out of a total of $156 
million to economic projects while projects focused on improving institutional capacity (which 
includes development of the civil sector) have only gotten $28 million and reconciliation projects 
only got $7.3 million.  Part of this is of course that economic development projects can cost more 
especially when dealing with large-scale efforts like development of the banking industry, yet at 
the same time it is clear that the US, for better or worse, has a larger commitment to economic 
development if its 8 projects out of 22 amount to 71% of its total budget.  When it comes to 
matters of aid there are numerous opinions as to what should be focused on when developing a 
nation and what makes the best strategy. 
The EU on the other hand has more information available about it projects overall, but 
that information is less detailed and even more difficult to find.  As stated previously, there is a 
noticeable gap between the total amount of aid reported to have been given and what is actually 
accounted for in its listed projects available online.  The EU is known for having a complex 
bureaucracy and in BiH it is no difference.  There ought to be just one organization of the EU 
that deals with Bosnian affairs as this would be more efficient and make it easier for Bosnians to 
work with.  The EU delegation has focused much more on economic development projects than 
anything else with only 3 projects dedicated to state consolidation for a net value of about 2.3 
million Euros which sounds like a lot, but these programs are spread out over multiple years and 
are only a small part of the overall aid that is given. 
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From all of this data it is clear that the EU and the US have invested a lot of time, energy, 
and funds in Bosnia DQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VGHYHORSPHQWWhile USAID presents on its website 
clear results of its efforts, the EU can contribute the passing over several large reforms to its 
name including the creation of one governmental body to deal with foreign aid, police reform, 
and the creation of a governmental Anti-Corruption Agency.  USAID is on the right track with 
its number of projects on promoting reconciliation, but it would be beneficial for the EU to get 
more invested again in the peace-building side of state consolidation, because for BiH to ever 
truly work as a unified state there must be a growth in trust and understanding in order for the 
country to move forward. 
So far it has been explained what the role overall of the US and the EU has been in BiH, 
and it is clear both organizations have had DQLPSDFWRQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD¶VVWDWH
consolidation, but the real question is why all of these have efforts not affected greater change.  
To that end three variables shall be addressed while looking at the EU and USAID: institutional 
capacity, legitimacy, and economic development. 
Institutional Capacity 
USAID and the EU have both done a lot towards increasing institutional capacity both at 
the local and federal levels, but for the most part there have not been many major changes.  At 
the end of the day the government remains bloated and inefficient with 40% of all employed 
persons working on some form of government sector87 and there remains a lack of coordination 
between the different levels of government throughout the country.  The EU has been working 
with the Council of Ministers to create an effective coordination mechanism for the 
                                                                                                                    
87  Mirascic,  Goran.  "Current  Economic  Situation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Journal  of  International  &  Global  
Studies  3,  no.  1  (November  2011):  39.  Academic  Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  17,  2013).  
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implementation and enforcement of EU laws, but so far this has not yielded results88.  Some 
federal institutions have been strengthened, but the federal government overall is still weak and it 
can be argued that strengthening the federal government only serves to further enlarge and 
FRPSOLFDWHWKLVFRXQWU\¶VEXUHDXFUDF\.  That being said, there has been a positive trend in state 
consolidation over time, as evidenced by the police reform, judicial reform, and much more, it is 
just that progress has been too slow. 
The EU delegation since 2007 has only funded 3 institutional capacity projects about the 
creation of an anti-corruption network, support for prison management, and support for judicial 
reform.  Most everything else was achieved as a result of conditionality pressure, the most 
notable being police reform, the creation of an Anti-Corruption Agency, and the creation of a 
governmental body to handle all foreign aid.  There must be a balance of course in international 
involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the EU needs to put more emphasis in funding 
programs so as to improve institutional capacity. 
The US on the other hand has had more programs dealing with institutional capacity.  It 
has funded programs supporting pluralism within political parties, an anti-corruption network, 
civil society development, the strengthening of government institutions, judicial sector 
development, and education reform for a total value of almost $30 million.  All of these areas 
ZRUNZKHWKHUGLUHFWO\RULQGLUHFWO\WRLPSURYH%L+¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOFDSDFLW\,WLVFOHDUWKH86KDV
focused more supplementing institutional capacity, but one area that has not been addressed as 
much by the EU is constitutional reform.  The EU has relied solely on conditionality to pressure 
for constitutional change, but USAID, following its trend of supporting more civil society 
                                                                                                                    
88  European  Commission.  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  2013  Progress  Report.  p.  6,  10.  Accessed  April  5,  2014.  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ba_rapport_2013.pdf.  
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organizations, has its Strengthening Governing Institutions and Processes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina program what works within civil society to help develop a citizen-driven movement 
for constitutional reform.  This has the potential to be a great idea.  As previously argued, 
conditionality has not been effective in constitutional change.  The other option is to effect 
change from below.  The flaw with this strategy is that not all Bosnians believe in constitutional 
change either, if conditionality cannot effect change, it is up to the Bosnian people to do so. 
The US, much more than the EU, appears to have bought into this strategy.  There are 
positives and negatives to working directly with the government to affect direct change versus 
working with NGOs and civic organizations to affect change from below.  The biggest problem 
with working thHJRYHUQPHQWDVLWLVQRZLVWKDW%L+¶VJRYHUQPHQWGRHVKDYHDQLVVXHZLWK
corruption and inefficiency, but on the other hand, there is no guarantee either that aid given to 
the civil sector will be effective either because of the already low confidence of Bosnians in their 
governments.  In the end it is important to work with both, but working with civil society is more 
important because in order for there to be a real political cultural shift, there needs to be pressure 
from below. 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy, especially of the federal government still remains a big problem.  With the 
prominence of ethnic nationalists within the governments of BiH, even if the federal government 
is strengthened, if it is not recognized as legitimate that process is pointless.  Bosnian Serb 
nationalists identify much more with Republika Srpska than with BiH as a whole.  There is also a 
SUREOHPZLWK%RVQLDQVKDYLQJYHU\ORZOHYHOVRIEHOLHILQWKH%L+¶LQVWLWXWLRQV89.  That being 
                                                                                                                    
89  Mirascic,  Goran.  "Current  Economic  Situation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Journal  of  International  &  Global  
Studies  3,  no.  1  (November  2011):  40.  Academic  Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  17,  2013).  
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said, political elections have been one area of success for the international community, 
particularly in terms of legitimacy.  For a nation that did not have a history of democracy, 
elections have been consistent and most recently have been rated overall to be fair and free.  
However, this only means so much IRUDQDWLRQ¶VOHJLWLPDF\ 
The big issue with legitimacy is the question of sovereignty.  The Office of the High 
5HSUHVHQWDWLYHDQGRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOERGLHVZLWKLQWKH%L+JRYHUQPHQWFKDOOHQJHVWKLVQDWLRQ¶V
true sovereignty when it has individuals and organizations that can overrule Bosnian actions.  
Accordingly, there also is the issue of reforms coerced from the outside using conditionality or 
imposed from without.  The worst of this ZDVGXULQJWKHKHLJKWRIWKH2+5¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQLVW
period from about 2000-2006 when there would be about 90-150 decisions made per year.  This 
ZDVVHULRXVO\GDPDJLQJWR%L+¶VOHJLWLPDF\HVSHFLDOO\LQWKHH\HVRILWVFLWL]HQV7KRXJKWKH
2+5LVQRWLQYROYHGWRGD\LWVFRQWLQXHGH[LVWHQFHVWLOOLQWHUIHUHVLQ%L+¶VVRYHUHLJnty and 
legitimacy. 
  TKRXJK%L+¶VOHJLWLPDF\KDVLQFUHDVHGVRPHZKDWDVLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVKDYHJRWWHQ
less directly involved, the underlying issue in state consolidation remains in that even within the 
country there is no consensus as to what the state should be and how it should function.  In order 
for BiH to function and thrive as one state there needs to be a greater sense of identity of being 
³%RVQLDQ´2QHZD\WRGRWKLVLVWRKDYH greater participation and ownership of government 
reform by Bosnian citizens.  If citizens get involved and their demands are listened to by the 
government then that can create greater trust of the government and increase legitimacy. 
To that end USAID has supported a number of programs aimed at increasing political 
engagement aimed primarily at women and youth, but also for recruitment for specific reformist 
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aims like reconciliation.  The EU on the other hand has no reported programs for encouraging 
political engagement.  It might have some programs with this aim, but the EU delegation has not 
reported any such program as a part of the IPA.  Overall it can be said that the OHR did more 
harm than good in terms of promoting legitimacy and the EU has not done much more than that.  
USAID on the other hand in the past few years has put a lot more focus on developing civil 
society and as such has engaged more in programs for increasing civic engagement as well.  As 
civic engagement is a good tactic for increasing legitimacy such programming should be 
invested in more. 
Economic Development 
Economic development has been a big area of importance for all international actors in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  For any development project, economics is an important sector as it 
provides stability in more ways than one.  However, it is clear from the 44% estimated 
unemployment rate in BiH that international economic development has not been effective 
enough90.  The EU has focused more economic projects for ecotourism and rural and local 
development while US has focused on larger economic development in addition to local 
development as well. 
USAID has spent a lot of money on economic development programs, in particular on 
large-scale entrepreneurship interests like developing the banking sector, helping companies 
compete in the international market, though it also has focused on fostering agriculture and local 
development projects.  The EU delegation under IPA has also spent a lot of money on economic 
                                                                                                                    
90  /͘͞dŚĞtŽƌůĚ&ĂĐƚďŽŽŬ͗ŽƐŶŝĂĂŶĚ,ĞƌǌĞŐŽǀŝŶĂ͘͟>ĂƐƚDŽĚŝĨŝĞĚDĂƌĐŚϯϭ͕ϮϬϭϰ͘
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/bk.html  
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development, particularly on ecotourism, rural and local development programs, and regional 
programs.  It also has much more specific economic programs for things like mining equipment. 
One big problem that both organizations have tried to address is corruption and barriers 
to business start-ups.  As previously discussed, both of these things have negative impacts on the 
economy as corruption not only wastes money, but also creates unfair hiring situations marked 
by nepotism and bribery91.  Business barriers are also seriously harmful as it makes that much 
harder for small businesses to be created which would help with the high unemployment rate.  
Mirascic argues the best ways improve the economy there are: an increase in investments, an 
increase in competitiveness of exports, a decrease of agricultural imports, more exploitation of 
the energy sector as BiH is a resource rich country, partnership between public and private 
sectors, and cooperation between universities and the economy92.  USAID has in fact done 
programs for the first two and the EU has worked on the third, but the last two should be 
invested in by these aid organizations if they are not being adequately covered by other 
international actors so as to improve economic development which in turn helps fund the 
government which already is running on a deficit. 
To recount, my hypothesis argued that the international community has failed in creating 
an effective federal state because the projects that were created and funded by these two 
organizations have been ineffective because they have not focused on the right areas.  The 
emphasis on economic development is all well and good, but there needs to be more emphasis on 
state-building and more importantly, on reconciliation.  Reconciliation is of utmost importance 
                                                                                                                    
91  Chêne,  Marie.  Corruption  and  Anti-­‐Corruption  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  Anti-­‐Corruption  Resource  Centre,  
2009.  http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-­‐and-­‐anti-­‐corruption-­‐in-­‐bosnia-­‐and-­‐herzegovina-­‐bih/.  
92  Mirascic,  Goran.  "Current  Economic  Situation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina."  Journal  of  International  &  Global  
Studies  3,  no.  1  (November  2011):  43.  Academic  Search  Premier,  EBSCOhost  (accessed  September  17,  2013).  
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because it is the only way BiH can ever become a fully functional cohesive state.  State-building 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is profoundly difficult because of the complex structure and 
corruption, but that is precisely why it needs more attention.  Therefore, the international 
community has been ineffective because not enough emphasis has been placed on those kinds of 
reforms. 
My second hypothesis argued that WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶VFRQGLWLRQDOLW\WKDW
comes with aid and the conditions that are part of the process of accession into the EU have been 
ineffective as catalysts for real reforms and change.  There are many factors for this, but the two 
biggest are a lack of willingness from political elites and the difficulty of constitutional reform in 
any country.  &OHDUO\WKH(8¶VFRQGLWLRQDOLW\KDVEHHQVRPHZKDWHIIHFWLYHLQSURGXFLQJVRPH
reforms, but at the end of the day it has yet to produce any kind of constitutional reform.  This is 
why I argue that conditionality has reached its plateau in BiH.  It can still be a useful tool for 
pressuring for smaller reforms, but when it comes to the big questions of constitutional reforms, 
in particular the inability to pass constitutional reforms to ensure minority rights even after half 
of their aid from the EU has been cut off, it seems questionable that conditionality alone can 
force unwilling Bosnian politicians to change.  Unless the elections later this year provide a more 
cooperative government (particularly from Republika Srpska), it may be best for the EU to focus 
on initiating reform from below by empowering Bosnian citizens and civic organizations to force 
their government to change. 
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Conclusion: 
 At the end of the day, for all of the pessimism both in and outside the country, when one 
looks at the long-term growth of Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of democracy and state 
capacity there has been positive growth.  Changes have happened, slowly, but surely.  Even as 
ethnic-based political parties continue to be a prominent part of Bosnian politics, today there are 
a number of political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are not primarily ethnically-
DIILOLDWHG,WKDVEHHQ\HDUVVLQFHWKHVHFRQGEHJLQQLQJRI³%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD´,QWKDW
time another generation that has never known war has been born and has come of age.  It is those 
young people and the Bosnian people who protested the government earlier this year who may in 
the future become the shakers and movers of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The process of 
development is not a one-sided endeavor of USAID, the EU, and other organization and nations.  
It is a two-way process that must involve wholeheartedly Bosnian politicians, organizations, and 
citizens who are willing to compromise and to adapt to a world that is ever-changing in order for 
BiH to be able to prosper and grow. 
In the future there are many things I would do in order to further my research in this topic.  
First of all, I must acknowledge there were many constraints in this paper.  International 
involvement in the political development of any country is an ambitious subject, but for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with the sheer number of actors involved this is doubly so.  The research done 
for this paper primarily focused on two main international actors, but this did not include primary 
research on the Bosnian government itself.  Also there were few reports to be found on these 
projects so there was minimal data available to assess how effective these projects really have 
been.  In future research I would conduct primary research on the Bosnian government on many 
of the issues discussed in this paper, particularly looking into the specific projects and how much 
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of a result they really had so as to be able to compare strategies better and to determine exactly 
has worked best in BiH.  In addition, I would complete my data collection for USAID and for the 
EU as well as collect data on other major actors involved so as to get a more complete picture.  I 
ZRXOGDOVRORRNLQWREHWWHUGHILQLQJZKDWLWPHDQVIRUDSURMHFWWREH³HIIHFWLYH´,QWKHHQGWKLV
is a topic that needs further research by more scholars not only so to better understand how best 
to improve development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to look at how to better long-term 
development practices by the international community throughout the world. 
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